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The Supreme Court began its 2009 Term by addressing the constitutional rights of
corporations. It ended the Term by addressing the incorporated rights of the
Constitution. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, a five-member
majority of the Court held that corporations have a First Amendment right to spend
their own money on political advocacy. A corporation generally is no different than
a natural person when it comes to the First Amendment-at least as it relates to
political speech. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, a plurality of the Court held that
the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is incorporated through
the Due Process Clause and applies to states and municipalities. Neither the federal
government nor states may prevent persons from keeping and bearing arms in their
homes for self-defense.
Given this new world in both senses of incorporation, the time has come to explore
the issue of Second Amendment rights and the corporate form. This Article will
offer an analysis of the potential Second Amendment rights of the corporation.
And it will, in the process, provide a more systematic critique of corporate constitu-
tional rights in general.
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INTRODUCTION
Themes of incorporation bracketed the Supreme Court's block-
buster 2009 term. The Term began with a case concerning the constitu-
tional rights of the corporation. In Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,1 the Court ruled five to four that corporations possess
the same First Amendment rights to engage in political speech as do
natural persons. 2 The Court "rejected the argument that political
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differ-
ently under the First Amendment simply because such associations
are not 'natural persons."' 3
The Term ended with a case concerning the incorporated rights of
the Constitution. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held that
the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms restricts state
and local governments to the exact same degree it restricts the federal
government.4 The right to bear arms for self-defense is a fundamental
right, incorporated against the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 That clause prohibits states from
depriving "'any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law."'' 6
While many hailed McDonald's outcome,7 a majority of
Americans responded to Citizens United with scorn.8 One online sati-
rist posted a mock headline stating "High Court Rules Corporations
Have Right To Bear Arms."9 But the idea of Second Amendment
rights for corporations cannot be dismissed as a good punch line. If
Citizens United is taken seriously, the Second Amendment, like the
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2 Id. at 886.
3 Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)).
4 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036, 3050 (2010).
5 See id. at 3030-31 (declining to use the Privileges or Immunities Clause to incorpo-
rate the Second Amendment).
6 Id. at 3028 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) (emphasis added).
7 See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n, Inst. for Legislative Action, Statement by
Wayne LaPierre, Exec. Vice President, Nat'l Rifle Ass'n (NRA) and Chris W. Cox, Exec.
Dir., Nat'l Rifle Ass'n-Inst. for Legislative Action, Regarding U.S. Supreme Court
Decision McDonald v. City of Chicago (June 28, 2010), http://www.nraila.org/News/Read/
NewsReleases.aspx?ID=13956.
8 To the extent it is relevant, early polling placed opposition to the decision as high as
eighty percent. Dan Eggen, Poll. Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court's Decision on
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html.
9 Steven Clifford, High Court Rules Corporations Have Right To Bear Arms,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2010, 1:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-clifford/
high-court-rules-corporat-b_435619.html; see also Jim Gallagher, Letter to the Editor,
TIME, July 26, 2010, at 9 (commenting on Citizens United and asking rhetorically whether a
corporate right to bear arms is next).
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First Amendment and like many other provisions of the Bill of Rights,
guarantees liberties to natural and corporate persons alike.
Corporations, no less than natural persons, need to defend them-
selves. Yet some states highly regulate a corporation's ability to pro-
vide security to protect its employees and customers from violence
and its property from theft. 10 A dozen states actually require a corpo-
ration to allow armed employees and visitors onto its property and
grounds." Associations, no less than natural persons, have an interest
in banding together for self-protection, but many states have anti-
militia laws that restrict the ability of private groups to train together
with private arms or to form private self-defense forces. 12 Finally,
some corporations manufacture, sell, or distribute arms. Yet these col-
lective bodies are subject to restrictions on their businesses to a far
greater degree than individuals. 13
Plus, doctrinally, the Court's repeated reference to the First
Amendment as an interpretive analog for the Second would seem to
augur for some level of corporate Second Amendment rights. Fol-
lowing the logic of the Court, corporate claims to Second Amendment
10 See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK,
2010-11 EDITION: SECURITY GUARDS AND GAMING SURVEILLANCE OFFICERS (2011),
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos159.htm [hereinafter OUTLOOK HANDBOOK] (sum-
marizing such regulations); see also Private Investigators and Private Security Agents Act,
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 17-40-101-107 (2001) (setting forth the licensing requirements and
qualifications for private security agents); Private Security Guards Act, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §§ 9401-9418 (1999) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4749.01-4749.10
(West 2004) (regulating private investigators and security guards, including their use of
firearms). Note that state regulation is neither uniform nor uniformly strict.
11 Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah. ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.800
(2010); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-781 (Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.251 (West
Supp. 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-135 (Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-11-2
(West Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c11(a)(1) (Supp. 2009); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 237.110(17) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:292.1 (Supp. 2009);
MINN. STAT. § 624.714(18) (Supp. 2011); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-37-1 (West 1999); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.7 (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5a-102 (LexisNexis 2010).
For a discussion of these laws, see Dayna B. Royal, Take Your Gun to Work and Leave It
in the Parking Lot: Why the OSH Act Does Not Preempt State Guns-at-Work Laws, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 475, 495-503 (2009) and Stefanie L. Steines, Note, Parking-Lot Laws: An Assault
on Private-Property Rights and Workplace Safety, 93 IowA L. REV. 1171 (2008).
12 For a discussion of private militia-related regulations, including at least 38 states that
limit or prohibit the formation of private military units, see Thomas B. McAffee,
Constitutional Limits on Regulating Private Militia Groups, 58 MONT. L. REV. 45, 54-56
(1997). See also Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F.
Supp. 198, 208 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (enjoining the paramilitary activities of the Klan's military
arm on the grounds that military operations are not entitled to constitutional protection).
13 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(9)-(11), (a)(21) (2006) (defining persons "in the business of"
manufacture, importation, or dealing in firearms from others); see also infra Part I.C.2
(discussing regulations and restrictions that implicate corporate Second Amendment
rights).
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rights seem to advance the same kind of liberty and antityranny goals
that animate the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 14 The Court
justifies corporate political speech rights as necessary to prevent
monopolization of the political discourse by government. A similar
argument could be made with respect to the Second Amendment: a
corporate right to keep and bear arms is necessary to prevent monop-
olization of the tools of violence by the state.15
Corporate Second Amendment rights are at the frontier of
Second Amendment doctrine. The remarkable 2009 Supreme Court
Term provides an opportunity to examine how courts may implement
the Second Amendment in a world populated by corporate persons.
But this Article's critique is broader. The possibility of corporate
Second Amendment rights raises important questions about the place
of corporations in our republic. Corporations, like churches, unions,
and political parties, are powerful intermediary organizations that are
positioned between the individual and the state. 16
Business corporations in particular possess a degree of coercive
power equal to, and occasionally greater than, that of government.
17
Despite their power and prevalence, the constitutional claims of these
intermediary organizations have frustrated efforts at consistent adju-
dication. The prospect of British Petroleum or Wal-Mart or General
Electric claiming a right to arm itself in a manner once reserved only
for municipal police departments or state militias provides an oppor-
tunity to revisit all of our unresolved debates regarding collective
action, power, sovereignty, and individual rights.
This Article, therefore, has three goals: first, to explain how the
Court may implement the Second Amendment in the corporate con-
text; second, to use that discussion as a springboard for a more thor-
ough critique of corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence; and
14 See infra Part I.C.1 (discussing the First Amendment framing of the Second
Amendment).
15 Id.
16 See infra Part IV; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate
Speech Is Not Free, 83 IowA L. REV. 995, 998-99 (1998) (reviewing arguments that a dem-
ocratic society needs intermediate institutions as a counterbalance to government).
17 Indeed, there is a long history of scholarship addressing private corporations exer-
cising power as functional sovereigns. See, e.g., Wolfgang G. Friedmann, Corporate Power,
Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 155, 165 (1957) (consid-
ering the tension between the state and corporation in terms of ongoing "dialectic pro-
cess"); Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129 (2008);
Arthur S. Miller, Toward Constitutionalizing the Corporation: A Speculative Essay, 80 W.
VA. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (1978) (considering the assertion of constitutional rights against
corporate "private governments"); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, The Semi-sovereign
Corporation (Univ. of Utah S.J. Quinney Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, Paper No. 05-04, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstracts=757315 (examining the
"diminish[ed]" modern state in an age of ascendant corporate power).
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third, to offer preliminary thoughts on how to reframe the corporate
constitutional rights issue in a way that is functional, yet respectful of
institutional approaches to fostering, protecting, and regulating inter-
mediary organizations.
Part I begins with Citizens United. In particular, it examines the
Court's conclusion that corporations and natural persons are nearly
indistinguishable when it comes to core political speech rights. Part I
then transitions to McDonald. It focuses on the Court's holding that
the Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment protect
"persons" from both federal and state infringements on the right to
keep and bear arms.18 Part I then ties these cases together. It forecasts
how First Amendment analog, including Citizens United, may influ-
ence the Court's evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. It then
outlines four specific regulations that a corporate Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms could affect.
Part II expands the analysis. It begins with a survey of existing
corporate constitutional rights doctrine. It first examines First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,19 the only case in which the Court
attempts to articulate a uniform test for corporate constitutional
rights. Specifically, it explains how Bellotti fails to justify its default
presumption that corporations are constitutional persons. It also
explains how Bellotti fails to appreciate the way in which corporate
personhood theory influences the Court's decisions on corporate con-
stitutional rights.
Next, Part II details the three dominant theories of corporate per-
sonhood-the artificial, real, and aggregate theories. It explains how
courts use these theories to justify both the existence of and the limits
on corporate constitutional liberties.
Part III applies the existing jurisprudential framework for corpo-
rate constitutional rights to the Second Amendment. Using the four
specific examples of corporate regulation outlined in Part I, it explains
how the Bellotti test, combined with the Court's characterization of
corporate personhood, may lead the Court to conclude that corpora-
tions have no Second Amendment rights, some restricted Second
Amendment rights, or Second Amendment rights equivalent to those
of natural persons.
Part IV discusses how corporate Second Amendment rights will
test the Court's trust in the salutary nature of intermediary organiza-
tions in our society, and how it will challenge the Court's avowed pref-
erence for originalist and textualist methodologies in constitutional
18 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3028 (2010).
19 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:887
October 2011]
adjudication. It demonstrates how the limited constitutional vocabu-
lary for intermediary organizations is a problem, and it sketches the
preliminaries of an alternative method of approaching corporate con-
stitutional rights in the future.
I
CITIZENS UNITED, MCDONALD, AND THE QUESTION OF
CORPORATE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Read together, Citizens United and McDonald signal that corpo-
rations may lay some claim to Second Amendment rights.20 To under-
stand why, this Part examines Citizens United and McDonald and
then discusses these cases in light of existing corporate constitutional
rights jurisprudence.
A. Citizens United and Corporate Political Speech Rights
Citizens United is a revolution in corporate constitutional doc-
trine. It is a near-complete vindication of the belief that the
Constitution protects a corporation's political speech just as much as it
protects the political speech of individuals. But the case began nar-
rowly, with a dispute over whether on-demand video streaming of a
political hit piece about Hillary Clinton, Hillary: The Movie,21 violated
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).22
President George W. Bush signed BCRA on March 27, 2002,
despite vociferous opposition from pundits and fellow Republicans.
BCRA restricted, among other things, independent corporate expend-
itures for "electioneering communication[s]" that take place within
thirty days of a primary election or within sixty days of a general elec-
tion. 23 BCRA was just one of a suite of federal and state regulations
20 Here I refer to Second Amendment rights the corporation can claim in its own name,
not in the well-established sense that an association, like the NAACP or the NRA, pos-
sesses Article III standing to assert the rights of at least one of its members. See, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (finding that for associational standing "[t]he
association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or
threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit").
21 To call the documentary a hit piece is merely to restate the Court's description.
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 890 (2010) ("The movie, in essence, is a feature-
length negative advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton for
President.").
22 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered titles of U.S.C.); see Richard
L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 591-92
(2011) (discussing the modest beginnings of Citizens United).
23 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (citing 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2) (2006)).
An "electioneering communication," according to the Court, is "'any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication' that 'refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office"'
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designed to prevent corruption in politics. Corruption, or the appear-
ance of corruption, had long justified regulation of direct contribu-
tions to candidates. 24 But as campaigns became more complex and
media buys became more expensive, regulators began to see the
potential for corruption from even independent expenditures of
money.
BCRA and its state-law analogs regulated two specific risks
posed by large corporate expenditures: first, the risk that corporate
money could exaggerate the apparent popularity of an otherwise
minority corporate viewpoint (the distortion problem);25 and second,
the risk that corporate managers might spend the money of dissenting
investors on speech that the investors found offensive (the dissenting
investor problem).26
As a regulatory solution, governments restricted independent
expenditures by corporations and forced them to form separate
Political Action Committees (PACs). The theory was that PACs more
accurately represented the popularity of the corporate political speech
and better protected dissenting investors, because only those individ-
uals who wanted to contribute to the PAC would do so. 27
Litigation and legislation crafted two important exceptions to
these rules. First, nonprofit political organizations were generally
exempt for obvious reasons: Those who contributed to these organiza-
tions did so specifically because they are political, and so neither the
distortion nor the dissenting investor rationale justified the restric-
tion.28 Second, media companies were generally exempt because a
media company's core business is the dissemination of information.
By crafting an exemption, regulators recognized the important, but
and which is "'publicly distributed."' (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006), 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.29(a)(2) (2009)).
24 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115-19 (2003) (detailing the history of campaign
contribution legislation).
25 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (discussing the distortion rationale).
26 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 805-06 (1978) (White, J., dis-
senting) (observing that shareholders may not share the political goals of corporate man-
agers or expect their investment in the company to be used to advance those goals).
27 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 670 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The resources available to [a PAC], as opposed to the corporate treasury, in
fact reflect popular support for the political positions of the committee." (quoting FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 258 (1986))).
28 See Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 259-61 (1986) (noting that the restriction on a
nonprofit corporation's independent expenditure was not compelling because the corpora-
tion was not formed to amass wealth, and because people who contribute "are fully aware
of its political purposes, and in fact contribute precisely because they support those
purposes").
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not exclusive, role that media companies play in informing the
public.29
Corporations tested the pre-BCRA restrictions in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce.30 The Austin Court considered the
constitutionality of a Michigan law that prohibited corporations from
using their general funds for independent political advocacy. 31 Austin
reaffirmed that legislatures could limit independent corporate expend-
itures in support of, or in opposition to, a candidate. 32 The Michigan
legislature had undoubtedly restricted core political speech. But for
the Austin majority, the state had articulated a sufficiently compelling
government interest: the risk of distortion by powerful corporate
speakers. 33 Business corporations enjoy the benefits of state corporate
law, including "limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treat-
ment of the accumulation and distribution of assets, '34 which make
them dominant players in the economic marketplace. 35 The govern-
ment articulated a compelling interest in ensuring that the state-
enabled corporate dominance of economic markets did not allow cor-
porations to dominate political markets as well.36 Neither Michigan's
exception for nonprofit ideological organizations nor its exception for
media companies was found to undermine the constitutionality of the
law.37
Justice Brennan's concurrence focused on the protection of dis-
senting investors. He acknowledged the longstanding "importance of
state corporate law in 'protect[ing] the shareholders' of corporations
chartered within the State."'38 To Brennan, Michigan's law advanced
the compelling interest of preventing corporations from using share-
29 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 666-68 (finding that the government has a compelling interest
in treating media companies differently from other types of companies for purposes of
campaign finance regulation); cf. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 781-82 (noting that "[t]he press cases
emphasize the special and constitutionally recognized role of [the press] in informing and
educating the public," but also noting that "the press does not have a monopoly on either
the First Amendment or the ability to enlighten").
30 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
31 Id. at 654.
32 Id. at 655.
33 Id. at 659-60.
34 Id. at 658-59.
35 Id. at 659.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 661-62, 666. The Court took pains to distinguish nonprofit corporations-
whose activities enjoyed far more protection than those of the Chamber of Commerce-
and the individuals associated with them, from profit-oriented companies. See id. at 662-65
(observing that the Chamber of Commerce is more akin to a business corporation than a
nonprofit ideological organization like Massachusetts Right to Life).
38 Id. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481
U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (alteration in original)).
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holder money to promote political causes a shareholder might find
antithetical to his or her own interests or conscience. 39
Hours after President Bush signed BCRA, Kentucky Senator
Mitch McConnell and the National Rifle Association challenged the
legislation in court.40 Although BCRA provided the casus belli for a
renewed constitutional attack by First Amendment activists, Austin
was the real target.
The first shot fizzled. In McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission41 the Court wrote a dense, fragmented opinion that
essentially upheld BCRA's prohibitions on corporate expenditures.4 2
The Court continued to accept Austin's rationale that democracy must
be protected from "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth.., accumulated with the help of the corporate
form."'43 After McConnell, narrow court rulings followed. 44
Citizens United initially appeared to be another misfire-just one
more small-bore ruling on the technicalities of BCRA. The Court
took full briefing and oral argument on March 24, 2009. Three months
passed without a ruling. Then, on June 29, 2009, the Justices surprised
court-watchers by directing further briefing. The question: "[S]hould
the Court overrule either or both Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) . . . and the part of McConnell v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) ... which addresses the
facial validity of Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
39 Id. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("A stockholder might oppose the use of funds
drawn from the general treasury-which represents, after all, his money-in support of a
particular political candidate."). The fact that a dissenting investor could try to change
company policy from the inside, or sell his shares in the corporation to protest the speech
did not make the government interest any less compelling. See id. at 674 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("[Tihese options [for exit from the corporation] would impose a financial
sacrifice on those objecting to political expenditures."). Although Brennan acknowledged
that, in the case of the Chamber of Commerce, one company's shareholder's money had
been sent to another company to advance political speech, the difference was inconsequen-
tial to the point of protecting the investment of objecting shareholders. See id. at 672-74
(Brennan, J., concurring).
40 See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 206 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that
McConnell filed suit "within hours" of Bush's signature).
41 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
42 For an in-depth discussion of this case, see Hasen, supra note 22.
43 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 2005 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 660), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
44 See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (discussing a challenge
to the BCRA as applied to an ideological organization advertisement); see also Hasen,
supra note 22, at 590 (discussing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life).
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of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b?" 45 The Court set the hearing for September
9, 2009, a month before the traditional opening of the Court term.46
At oral argument, three Justices peppered counsel with questions
on the relevance of corporate personhood to the First Amendment
analysis. Justice Stevens asked, "does the First Amendment permit
any distinction between corporate speakers and individual
speakers?" 47 Justice Ginsburg observed that "[a] corporation.. .is not
endowed by its creator with inalienable rights .... [I]s there any dis-
tinction that Congress could draw between corporations and natural
human beings for purposes of campaign finance?" 48 Counsel for
Citizens United, Theodore Olson, deflected these questions by
asserting the simple fact that the Court's prior speech cases had
always covered corporations. 49 Justice Sotomayor ventured that per-
haps the Court had made an "error to start with, not [in] Austin or
McConnell"; but rather, when "the Court imbued a creature of State
law," the corporation, "with human characteristics. 50
Whatever the other Court members thought of Justice
Sotomayor's question, it did not prevent a majority from concluding
that Congress had violated the free speech rights of Citizens United.
In a five to four decision, the Court struck down BCRA's ban on
independent expenditures as facially unconstitutional. 51
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, and the Court's position
was apparent within the first paragraph. McConnell depended on
Austin.52 Austin had held that core political speech could "be banned
based on the speaker's corporate identity. '53 And "Austin was a sig-
nificant departure from ancient First Amendment principles"; as such,
it was undeserving of continued respect under stare decisis.54
Justice Kennedy equated the constitutional dignity of natural per-
sons with that of corporations. He wrote that "[i]f [BCRA] applied to
individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or
manner restriction on speech. Its purpose and effect are to silence
45 Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (mem.); see also Robert Barnes,
Justices To Review Campaign Finance Law Constraints, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009, at A3
(noting that the September argument was a "surprise" and potential "blockbuster").
46 Barnes, supra note 45.
47 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).
48 Id. at 4.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 33.
51 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
52 See id. at 886 ("In this case we are asked to reconsider Austin and, in effect,
McConnell.").
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 490 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect. ' 55 To
Kennedy, corporations, no less than individuals, enjoy the same right
to speech because "[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content. ' 56 Corpo-
rations and other associations, no less than individuals, are partici-
pants in the marketplace of ideas.57
Neither the distortion rationale nor the dissenting shareholder
rationale justified restrictions on core First Amendment protections. 58
The fact that individuals choose to use the corporate form to amplify
their message is inconsequential. Austin, McConnell, and BCRA had
sinned against a cardinal rule of free speech-government had dared
to "interfere[ ] with the 'open marketplace' of ideas protected by the
First Amendment."5 9 As for dissenting shareholder concerns, Justice
Kennedy had faith that "procedures of corporate democracy" 60 would
prevent any abuse. Finally, it did not matter whether the corporation
was formed for ideological or for commercial purposes. A corporation
formed for any purpose has the same political speech rights as a nat-
ural person.61
Justice Scalia concurred. He agreed that corporate identity did
not justify restrictions on speech,62 but he rested his conclusion on
textual grounds. The text of the First Amendment says that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,"' 63 and the text
"makes no distinction between types of speakers." 64 While it is true
that the First Amendment's text, indeed "[a]ll the provisions of the
Bill of Rights," 65 protect individual men and women, "the individual
person's right to speak includes the right to speak in association with
55 Id. at 898.
56 Id. at 899.
57 See id. at 900 ("Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to
the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First
Amendment seeks to foster." (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal.,
475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
58 Id. at 904, 911.
59 Id. at 906 (quoting N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208
(2008)). However, the majority did hold that BCRA's mandatory disclosure of the corpo-
rate source of the independent expenditure was constitutional. Id. at 913-16.
60 Id. at 911 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
61 See id. at 913 ("No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political
speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.").
62 The Chief Justice, in his concurrence, also endorsed this point: "The First
Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pam-
phleteer." Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
63 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
64 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 928.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:887
October 2011]
other individual persons."66 A business corporation's claim to free
speech is no different than that of an association of individuals, and it
cannot be denied on "the simplistic ground that [the corporation] is
not 'an individual American."' 67 Justice Scalia concluded with this
sweeping statement: "The [First] Amendment is written in terms of
'speech,' not speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any
category of speaker, from single individuals to partnerships of individ-
uals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated
associations of individuals .... "68 According to Justice Scalia, any
attempt to craft a special category of corporate persons for core First
Amendment purposes would be in clear derogation of the text.
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago and the Incorporated Right
To Keep and Bear Arms
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court dealt with incorpora-
tion in a different sense. The question before the Justices was whether
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment. If
it did, then the right to keep and bear arms would restrict state and
municipal governments alongside the federal government. 69 In District
of Columbia v. Heller,70 decided in 2008, the Court had held that the
Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a personal right.
According to the Court, laws that prevent a person from keeping and
transporting an operable handgun in the home are unconstitutional. 71
Prior to Heller, Second Amendment debates raged over whether the
right to keep and bear arms was a right possessed by every citizen
individually or whether it was a collective right reposed in the institu-
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 929.
69 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010). In Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall writing for the majority held
that the federal Bill of Rights protected individuals only from the national government. Id.
at 247. But through a series of rulings beginning in the early twentieth century and acceler-
ating in the next thirty years, nearly all of the protections of the Bill of Rights came to be
selectively incorporated to apply against states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15.6(b) (4th ed. 2007). Today, most guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are incorporated against the states, except the Third Amendment, the grand jury
requirement of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment civil jury trial, and the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Id. It is disputed whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment has been incorporated. Cf. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 (1989) (declining to decide whether the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to the states).
70 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
71 Id. at 628-29.
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tion of an organized state militia, such as the National Guard. 72 Heller
held that the right was individual; no person needs to belong to an
organized militia to claim a right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense.73 Instead, the Court held that the militia clause simply con-
templates a "citizens' or "people's" militia of individual rights-
holders who severally possess the right to keep and bear arms.74
Heller bound only the federal government. 75 McDonald
addressed whether Heller's Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms also applied to the states.76 In deciding this question, the
Court had to determine whether the Second Amendment applied
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,77
which protects "person[s]," 78 or through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 79 which protects "citizens. 80
A four-Justice plurality of the Court held that it is the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause that incorporates the Second
Amendment. 81 As Justice Atito wrote, "[s]elf-defense is a basic right,
recognized by many legal systems from ancient times to the present
day," and that the individual right to self-defense is "'the central com-
ponent' of the Second Amendment right. 82
72 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1278, 1292-93 (2009) (discussing the history of the indi-
vidual versus collective right to bear arms debate).
73 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 ("The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving
the militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly
thought it even more important for self-defense and hunting.").
74 Id. at 598-600.
75 Heller dealt with laws in the District of Columbia, a federal territory, and so its appli-
cation was limited to the federal government.
76 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010).
77 Id. at 3028 ("As a secondary argument, petitioners contend that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause 'incorporates' the Second Amendment right.").
78 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[NJor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ") (emphasis added).
79 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028 ("Petitioners' primary submission is that this right [to
keep and bear arms] is among the 'privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States'
. . . . .).
80 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.) (emphasis
added).
81 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050. Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence which would have
held that the Second Amendment is incorporated fully through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a "privilege of American citizenship." Id. at 3059 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
82 Id. at 3036 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)).
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The McDonald plurality again refused to designate any level of
scrutiny to evaluate the constitutionality of a regulation.83 In fact, it
"specifically rejected" the "balancing" of Second Amendment
rights.84 After McDonald, it appears that no restriction on the Second
Amendment can be justified on the basis that there is a compelling,
serious, or rational government interest that outweighs the constitu-
tional right, because the right itself is a product of balancing by the
Founders.85 However, this does not mean that the right is limitless.
Instead, the plurality reiterated that "longstanding regulatory mea-
sures," such as felon disarmament, prohibitions of firearms in "'sensi-
tive places,"' or qualifications for commercial sale of arms are
presumptively constitutional. 86 But it offered no justification for why
that is So. 8 7 Whether other categories of persons, arms, places, or
bearing fall outside the scope of Second Amendment protection was
left for another day.88
The McDonald Court, like the Heller Court, continued to de-
legitimate the organized militia as an institution that defines the scope
or purpose of the Second Amendment. Heller decoupled the right to
keep and bear arms from the organized militia; McDonald went fur-
ther and suggested the right was specifically guaranteed as a protec-
tion against the organized militia.89 The Court noted that the Second
Amendment is incorporated against the states specifically because
83 See id. at 3050 ("'The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of gov-
ernment-even the Third Branch of Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon."' (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 634)).
84 Id.
85 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (noting that, like the First Amendment, the Second
Amendment resulted from balancing of interests at the Founding). Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's reluctance, a number of lower courts have embraced some traditional
scrutiny analysis in Second Amendment cases. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d
673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d
792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (same).
86 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27). But see id. at 3127
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the source of these limitations and their provenance).
87 See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1356-58 (2009) (questioning the methodological source of these
exceptions); Miller, supra note 72, at 1293-96 (noting internal contradictions of these
exceptions); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law,
95 VA. L. REV. 253, 273 (2009) (observing that Heller seems to want to dodge the
"unpleasant consequences" of the Second Amendment right to bear arms); Adam Winkler,
Heller's Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1561 (2009) (remarking on the lack of
originalist support for these exceptions).
88 For speculation on the future of McDonald in the lower courts, see generally
Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago, 26 J.L. &
POL. 273, 294-301 (2011).
89 For a discussion of the complexities this suggestion produces, if taken seriously, see
Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939 (2011).
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Freedmen needed to deter both unreconstructed state militias as well
as private criminals. 90 Following the Civil War, African-Americans
were terrorized by local law enforcement, local militias, and white
supremacist organizations, 91 an ordeal that continued well into the
twentieth century. McDonald held that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Second Amendment to enable the Freedmen to
defend themselves against this corrupted state security apparatus.
C. The Question of Corporate Second Amendment Rights
Reading Citizens United and McDonald together leads to the
inevitable question: Do corporations possess Second Amendment
rights? If corporate associations enjoy core First Amendment protec-
tions that are indistinguishable from those of natural persons, what
about Second Amendment protections?
Before answering, I will address two potential objections to this
line of inquiry. The first objection is doctrinal. How relevant is
Citizens United, and indeed the entire First Amendment, to the anal-
ysis? 92 The second objection is practical. When, other than in a law
school hypothetical, would a corporation claim a constitutional right
to keep and bear arms?
This Part addresses these objections. First, it explains how the
Court uses First Amendment doctrine as a framing device for the
Second Amendment and how the Court seems to view the purposes of
the First and Second Amendments in similar terms. It then provides
examples of existing regulations that would be implicated by a corpo-
rate Second Amendment right.
1. First Amendment Framing of the Second Amendment
The Court uses the First Amendment as an interpretive template
for the Second. 93 In both Heller and McDonald, the Court repeatedly
90 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3043 (stating that, without the right to keep and bear
arms, blacks would be vulnerable to harassment by state militia and peace officers).
91 See id. at 3039 & n.20, 3043 (noting the disarmament of, and violence toward, blacks
during the decade after the Civil War).
92 See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 85, 90 n.32
(2010) (discussing the difficulty of using First Amendment analogs).
93 A sample of the scholarly literature comparing the two includes Joseph Blocher,
Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
375 (2009); David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Tenth Circuit: Three Decades of
(Mostly) Harmless Error, 86 DENy. U. L. REV. 901, 935 (2009); Miller, supra note 72, at
1292-1321; Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443,
1449,1458-59 (2009); see also United States v. Marzzarella, No. 09-3185, slip op. at 6-7 & 7
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hinted that lower courts should use the First Amendment as a
resource to implement the Second Amendment. 94
Certainly the First and Second Amendments appear to be textual
counterparts. Both are written in strong, prohibitory terms: "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech" 95; "[T]he right
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. '96
But the Court also expects First Amendment analogs to soften an
otherwise intolerably rigid Second Amendment text. Just as the Court
has said there is no right to yell "fire" in a crowded theater,97 the
Court has also said "the right to keep and bear arms is not 'a right to
keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever
and for whatever purpose."98 The Court has developed a rich selec-
tion of tempering doctrine in First Amendment cases. The Court's
First Amendment allusions in Heller and McDonald seem to offer
lower courts a limited license to use similar doctrine to avoid the
"unpleasant consequences" 99 of a too-literal approach to the Second
Amendment.
I use the phrase "limited license," because the Court has made
clear that not all First Amendment analogs are equal. Categories are
favored; balancing is denounced. Just as there are categorical excep-
tions for "obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets" in the First
Amendment, there are also categorical exceptions to the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.100 Schools are one such cat-
n.4 (3d Cir. July 29, 2010) (stating that the "First Amendment is the natural choice" for
understanding the scope of the Second).
94 See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3043-44 (arguing that just as the First Amendment
incorporated against states gives substantive guarantees, so too does the Second
Amendment); id. at 3054 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that because "[t]he First
Amendment freedom of speech is incorporated-not the freedom to speak on Fridays, or
to speak about philosophy," the Second Amendment-whatever its scope-is incorpo-
rated against states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) ("Just as the
First Amendment protects modern forms of communications... the Second Amendment
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms .... ") (citation
omitted); id. at 595 ("[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of
citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First
Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.").
95 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
96 Id. amend. II (emphasis added).
97 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
98 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
99 See Wilkinson, supra note 87, at 273 ("The Heller majority seems to want to have its
cake and eat it, too-to recognize a right to bear arms without having to deal with any of
the more unpleasant consequences of such a right.").
100 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
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egory, as are felons.10 But it is historically-glossed categories, rather
than case-by-case balancing or any of the more supple forms of First
Amendment doctrine, 10 2 that the Court has endorsed thus far.10 3 As
the Heller Court insists, the Second Amendment, "[1]ike the First...
is the very product of an interest balancing by the people. °10 4
Finally, the Court appears to regard the function of First and
Second Amendment protections as similar. According to the Court,
the First and Second Amendments serve dual functions. First, they
both advance personal liberty and autonomy. The First Amendment
protects speech because of Americans' deep fear of "giving govern-
ment the power to control men's minds." 10 5 This point has its mirror
in the Second Amendment, where the Court has reiterated that the
right to keep and bear arms is, at its core, about the autonomy associ-
ated with self-protection. 10 6
Second, the Court seems to view the First and Second
Amendments as important checks on overweening government. 10 7 In
Citizens United, the Court feared that public regulation of corporate
political speech would lead to government control of democratic dis-
course.' 08 In Heller and McDonald, the Court expressed concern that
tyranny could reign when government possesses a monopoly on the
tools (if not also the legitimacy) of violence. 10 9
Under the logic of the Court, these First and Second Amendment
purposes-self-actualization and government deterrence-are
advanced as much by protection of corporate behavior as by protec-
101 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27). But see id. at 3127
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the source of these limitations); see also supra note 87
(surveying scholarship that questions the historical provenance of these restrictions).
102 For example, First Amendment government interest analysis, levels of scrutiny, and
time, place, and manner regulations, are far looser than the type of doctrine the Court has
applied to the Second Amendment.
103 For a further discussion of the use of categories in First and Second Amendment
jurisprudence, see generally Blocher, supra note 93.
104 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
105 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
106 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036-37 (discussing the Second Amendment as a funda-
mental right to self-defense); see also Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms
Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131,
149-50 (2008) (describing autonomy as a justification for the Second Amendment).
107 For more discussion of these points, see infra Part III.
108 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898-99 (2010) (expressing concern if the
government imposes restrictions on speech based on identity of the speaker).
109 See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3043 (discussing the concern during Reconstruction
that the only persons able to possess weapons were police and militia forces); Heller, 554
U.S. at 598 ("[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms and organized,
they are better able to resist tyranny."); id. at 600 (finding that right reposed only in organ-
ized militia "does not assure the existence of a 'citizens' militia' as a safeguard against
tyranny").
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tion of individual behavior.110 Given the Court's reference to First
Amendment doctrine as a guide to the Second Amendment, and given
that the Court ascribes similar functions to the two Amendments, it is
logical that the First Amendment rights of corporations may influence
the Court's approach to the Second Amendment rights of corpora-
tions in a future case.
2. Regulations That Implicate Corporate Second Amendment
Rights: Private Security, Ideological Associations, Guns-to-
Work Laws, and the Commercial Firearm Industry
But what of the practical relevance of a corporate Second
Amendment right? When is such a case likely to arise? I offer four
specific examples of areas where government regulation of corporate
rights to keep and bear arms for self-defense is pervasive and
common: private security, ideological associations, "guns-to-work"
laws, and the commercial gun trade. I chose these four examples for
their salience, although one could imagine many more."' This Section
outlines the regulations in these four areas. I will return to them in
Part III and explain how the Court's different approaches to corpo-
rate personhood could result in different levels of constitutional via-
bility for these regulations.
First, consider private security. The private security industry is
large, grossing between thirty and fifty billion dollars a year. 112 The
Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that private security employment
will expand by fourteen percent by 2018, faster than the average of all
other occupations.113
Private security companies and their agents operate under some
fairly stringent, if uneven, government regulation. Private guards are
subject to random drug screening, background checks, and even spe-
cial certifications-far more regulation than would be imposed on an
110 See infra Part IV (discussing the role of intermediary organizations as mechanisms
for both self-fulfillment and as a buffer between an individual and the government).
Ill To begin, consider the rules concerning self-help by corporations in retaining their
property from shoplifters, or in repossessing property from others; consider the differences
in duties imposed when a security agent of a corporation uses violent self-defense, as
opposed to a lone individual. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 667, 670 (Mich.
1977) (noting that a private security guard was not obliged to retreat when confronted with
deadly force).
112 See LARRY K. GAINES, MICHAEL KAUNE & ROGER LEROY MILLER, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN ACTION: THE CORE, at 100 (2001) (describing the growth in, and size of, the
private security industry); JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN AMERICA,
at x (2003) (indicating revenues of the private security industry); PHILIP P. PURPURA,
SECURITY LOSS AND PREVENTION: AN INTRODUCTION 27 (5th ed. 2008) (describing the
growth and size of the private security industry).
113 OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, supra note 10.
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individual firearm owner or a group of armed citizens. 114 Two jurisdic-
tions, Washington and Arizona, have even gone so far as to specifi-
cally exclude corporations from their state right to bear arms, warning
that "nothing in this [constitutional] section [on the individual right to
bear arms] shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corpora-
tions to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men." 115
Does the Constitution permit private security companies to be treated
any differently from an unincorporated association, or even from a
lone individual?
Second, consider nonprofit self-defense, vigilance, religious, or
ideological organizations, many of which are organized as corpora-
tions. The Guardian Angels, famous for their red berets, is organized
as a nonprofit corporation,"16 as is at least one chapter of the Black
Panther Party.117 The parent organization for the border patrol group,
the Minutemen, is a 501(c)(4) organization." 18 Even the Ku Klux Klan
is organized as a nonprofit corporation in some states. 1 9 Could the
Guardian Angels, famous for being unarmed, decide to arm them-
selves and patrol the subway cars as a private protective association?
What about the hundreds of voluntary militia organizations nation-
wide that are currently restricted in their ability to train or assemble
as an armed force?1 20 What about those states that prohibit firearms
in houses of worship, which are often organized as nonprofit
corporations?1 21
114 See supra note 10 (citing various state regulations that govern corporate self
protection).
115 ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26 ("The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in
defense of himself or the state shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be
construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an
armed body of men."); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24 ("The right of the individual citizen to
bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this
section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain
or employ an armed body of men.").
116 See GUARDIAN ANGELS, http://www.guardianangels.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2011)
(describing the organization as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation).
117 See Corporation File Detail Report, CYBERDRIVEILLINOIS, http://www.ilsos.gov/
corporatellc/ (last visited July 5, 2010) (search for "black panther party"; then follow
hyperlink "Black Panther Party") (indicating that the entity is a nonprofit). This organiza-
tion now seems defunct.
118 See MINUTEMANHQ.coM, http://www.minutemanhq.comlhq/ (last visited Aug. 9,
2011) (describing its parent organization as 501(c)(4) nonprofit, tax-exempt organization).
119 See, e.g., Initial Articles of Incorporation of Brotherhood of Klans Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, Inc., Ohio Secretary of State, No. 200718401754 (2007) (on file with the New
York University Law Review).
120 See supra note 12 (compiling sources that discuss private militia organizations and
regulations).
121 Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, and North Dakota forbid guns in houses of worship.
Georgia is currently litigating this issue. See Rhonda Cook, Suit Aims To Lift Ban on Guns
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Third, consider guns-to-work laws. Currently, twelve states pro-
hibit a private employer from preventing an employee (and some-
times customers, contractors, and visitors) from storing a firearm in
his or her car on the employer's parking lot.122 Businesses reluctant to
allow firearms onto their property have thus far used property rights,
takings, and other grounds to challenge these laws. 123 Their arguments
could also be supported by the proposition that they, as corporations,
have the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense-independent of
the rights of their employees. In this line of argument, guns-to-work
laws impermissibly elevate the Second Amendment rights of individ-
uals over the Second Amendment rights of the corporation itself.
Fourth, consider the firearms industry. Approximately $1.4 bil-
lion worth of guns are sold every year.124 This figure does not capture
the numerous gun clubs, shooting ranges, trade shows, and other types
of commercial activity associated with firearms. At present, the fire-
arms industry is heavily regulated at not only the point of manufac-
ture, but also throughout the distribution chain. Heller and McDonald
insist that their opinions do not question the validity of commercial
firearm regulation. But, could a firearms manufacturer, distributor, or
other corporate entity claim a right to be free from government
restriction in the same way that the press is free under the First
Amendment? 2 5
Given the potential "tsunami"12 6 of Second Amendment litiga-
tion after McDonald, any one of these laws is ripe for Second
Amendment challenge. Indeed, some regulations are embroiled in liti-
in Church: Thomaston Minister Wants Weapon 'For Protection of His Flock.' Filing Lists
State, Upson County as Defendants, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 10, 2010, at B1 (discussing
the status of a suit to overturn Georgia law); Amy Leigh Womack, Guns-in-Churches
Injunction Denied by Federal Judge, MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 24, 2010, available at http://
www.vvmacon.com/2010/08/24/1238483/guns-in-churches-injunction-denied.html (same).
122 See supra note 11 (citing numerous regulations regarding a corporation's obligation
to permit armed individuals onto its property).
123 For an example of a challenge to guns-to-work laws by a consortium of retailers, see
Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (N.D. Fla. 2008). See also
Steines, supra note 11, at 1185-96 (analyzing whether parking lot laws violate the Takings
Clause).
124 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation: Firearms, in REGULATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 101 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002). These numbers are based on esti-
mates from earlier in the decade.
125 This issue is raised in current litigation involving a corporate plaintiff. See Ezell v.
City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2010 WL 3998104, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010) (identi-
fying "Action Target, Inc." as a named plaintiff against Chicago shooting range
regulations).
126 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3105 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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gation now. 127 Part III of this Article will therefore address how theo-
ries of corporate personality and corporate constitutional rights may
impact each of these specific examples. Part IV will explore how cor-
porate Second Amendment rights raise questions about the structure
of corporate constitutional rights in general.
But first, a primer on corporate constitutional rights is necessary
to understand how corporate Second Amendment rights may fit
within the existing framework.
II
CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS: A PRIMER
To understand how the Second Amendment might protect corpo-
rations, we must first understand why any constitutional provision
protects corporations. After all, corporations "are not themselves
members of 'we the people' by whom and for whom our Constitution
was established. ' 1 28 When they are mentioned in the records of the
Founders, it is often with suspicion. 129 Yet, corporations currently
claim varying degrees of parity with natural persons when it comes to
constitutional rights. Only by understanding how and why corpora-
tions have benefitted from constitutional protections in the past may
we begin to understand how and why corporations may benefit from
constitutional protections in the future.
This Part, therefore, offers a primer on corporate constitutional
rights. The aim is to explain the Court's past treatment of corporate
constitutional rights in light of corporate personality theory, so we
may anticipate in Part III how the modern Court may use this doc-
trine to implement corporate Second Amendment rights.
Part II.A surveys the current, incoherent Supreme Court doctrine
on corporate constitutional rights. It also explains why the only analyt-
ical framework that exists, a footnoted aside in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,1 30 is incomplete. Part II.B then explores how the
three prevailing theories of corporate personhood-the artificial
entity theory, the real entity theory, or the aggregation theory-
influence the Court when it decides a corporate constitutional rights
127 See Womack, supra note 121 (describing a Georgia suit to enjoin enforcement of the
prohibition of guns at church). For a look into the extensive litigation on gun shows in
California, see Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2009) (challenging a prohibi-
tion on gun shows on county property), vacated, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(remanding to a 9th Circuit panel for consideration in light of McDonald).
128 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 972 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 949-50 (reviewing the Founders' view of corporations in American
society).
130 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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case. Part III returns to the Second Amendment and explains how the
Court's analysis in Bellotti and these three theories of the corporate
personality could interact to form the analytical framework for the
Court's application of Second Amendment rights to corporations.
A. The Broken Jurisprudence of Corporate Constitutional Rights
"Corporations" do not appear in the text of the Constitution.
"Nations,"'131 "states,"'1 32 "people ,"133 "citizens," 134 and "tribes"1 35 all
appear in the text of the Constitution, but not corporations.136 Never-
theless, corporations fall within a category of entities protected by the
Constitution, sometimes. No unified theory governs when or to what
extent the Constitution protects a corporation. 37 Instead, the Justices
resort to a grab bag of history, metaphysical rumination, Lochnerian
tailings, and pragmatism to resolve the specific corporate constitu-
tional claim at hand. 38 The Court's approach has left us with a broken
and disjointed jurisprudence, a string cite rather than a doctrine.
131 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
132 Id. art. I, §§ 2, 3, 8, 9, art. II, § 2, art. III, § 2, art. IV, §§ 2, 3, 4, art. V, art. VI, art.
VII, amend. X, amend. XII, amend. XIV, § 1, amend. XVI, amend. XVIII, §§ 2, 3, amend.
XX, § 6, amend. XXI, § 3.
133 Id. pmbl., art. I, § 2, amends. I, II, IV, IX, X, XVII.
134 Id. art. III, § 2, art. IV, § 2, amend. XI, amend. XIV, §§ 1, 2, amend. XV, § 1, amend.
XIX, amend. XXIV, § 1, amend. XXVI, § 1.
135 Id. art. I, § 8.
136 For a discussion of the original understanding of corporate rights, see Jonathan A.
Marcantel, The Corporation as a "Real" Constitutional Person, U.C. DAvis Bus. L.J.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1620993.
137 As Michael Rivard put it, there is no coherent theory of corporate constitutional
rights-there are "only legal conclusions." Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a
General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for
Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1465 (1992).
138 One commentator has castigated the Court's method as "constitutional operation-
alism," a "pragmatic, antitheoretical approach to corporate rights." Carl J. Mayer,
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 577,
650 (1990); see also Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage
in Non-Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 399 (2006) (noting a "right-by-right
basis" of corporate constitutional decision making); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate
"Person": A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation,
37 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (noting "ad hoc, arbitrary" decision making, and
observing that "different corporate metaphors have been used within the same case, even
in interpreting different portions of the same Constitutional Amendment"); Charles R.
O'Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political
Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347,
1348 (1979) (noting a lack of consistency in constitutional jurisprudence on the nature of
the corporation and its rights); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1999) ("[E]lection law has not settled on a single, coherent con-
ception of the corporation-what it is, what values it serves, and what role it should play in
politics."). A list of corporate claims to specific constitutional rights and their outcomes is
printed in Carl Mayer's work. See Mayer, supra at 664-67.
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Today, corporations possess some First Amendment free speech
and press rights, 39 some rights of expressive association, 140 and (per-
haps) some right to free exercise.' 41 They enjoy Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable searches 142 but only a limited right to pri-
vacy.1 43 Corporations possess Fifth Amendment rights against double
jeopardy144 and takings145 but no rights against self-incrimination. 146
The Sixth Amendment guarantees corporations a right to trial by
jury147 and to counsel 148 but not a right to appointed counsel. 49 Cor-
porations are "citizens" for purposes of Article III jurisdictional
139 See First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (discussing the corpo-
rate right to political speech); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 249-51 (1936)
(holding that a press corporation is a person entitled to the protection of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments).
140 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8-9, 17 n.14 (1986)
(holding that California cannot force a private, but heavily regulated, utility company to
use space in its mailing envelopes to transmit potentially offensive messages from its
customers).
141 See Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d
1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a corporate right to the free exercise of religion).
142 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (finding a corporate right
against warrantless inspections by workplace safety regulators).
143 See Fleck & Assocs. v. City of Phoenix, 471 F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding
no corporate right of privacy in regard to running a sex-oriented club); see also United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650-52 (1950) (finding lesser privacy protections
for corporations than natural persons).The Court recently held that corporations have no
statutory privacy rights under the Freedom of Information Act, but declined to address any
constitutional privacy issue. FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1179 (2011).
144 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 565, 575 (1977) (finding
corporation had rights against double jeopardy).
145 See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (holding that
a foreign corporation has the right to claim takings violation under Fifth Amendment).
146 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1911) (finding that a corporation
has no power to claim the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906) (same).
147 See United States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 378-80 (6th Cir. 1971) (holding
that corporations have the same Sixth Amendment right to jury as natural persons);
United States v. Greenpeace, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (same).
Corporations also have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury in federal court. See Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 536, 542 (1970) (holding that an individual can claim derivative
right to civil jury under the Seventh Amendment if a corporation would have had a right to
a jury).
148 United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979)
("Consequently, we hold that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel applies to
corporate defendants.").
149 See United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Being incorpo-
real, corporations cannot be imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed
counsel."); see also United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 350 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing
Unimex with approval). But cf Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873
n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It appears beyond sensible debate that corporations ... do indeed
enjoy the right to retain counsel.").
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powers150 but not "citizens" for purposes of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. 151 Corporations are "persons" with Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection 152 and procedural due pro-
cess 153 and some, but not all, of the incorporated Bill of Rights. 154
Corporations are also "persons" who may spend money to influence
voters,155 but they cannot themselves become voters under the
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth Amendments. 156
A footnote in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti157 is the
closest the Court has come to creating a standard test. According to
Justice Powell's Bellotti decision, the Constitution protects corpora-
tions except for "[c]ertain 'purely personal' guarantees."158 Whether a
constitutional right is "'purely personal' or is unavailable to corpora-
tions for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and pur-
pose of the particular constitutional provision."1 59
150 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1188 (2010) (citing Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio
R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 327-28 (1854) and Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v.
Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558-59 (1844)).
151 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) ("The term citizens... [as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment] applies only to natural persons ... not to artificial persons
created by the legislature .... ").
152 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (applying equal protec-
tion to a corporation based on "well established" view that corporations are persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment); Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)
(stating it is clear that corporations are entitled to equal protection).
153 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1984)
(finding due process rights against the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
154 Compare Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (finding that
liberty is not included as a right of corporations), with First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Belotti,
435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (finding that corporations have First Amendment rights). The
Supreme Court has yet to hold that corporations have Eighth Amendment rights against
cruel and unusual punishment and rights against excessive fines (even if the latter were
incorporated). See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276
n.22 (1989) ("We shall not decide whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on exces-
sive fines applies to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, nor shall we
decide whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as individuals."). But
see id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting the
application of the Excessive Fines Clause to corporations). They also have, according to
one court, a right against bills of attainder. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pataki, 292 F.3d 338,
346-47 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that corporations are protected by the Attainder Clause but
noting a split in authority).
155 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (striking down restrictions on
corporate independent expenditures as a First Amendment violation).
156 See id. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing, sarcastically, that the majority's
reasoning would require corporations to have the right to vote); Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of
Fayetteville, 269 S.E.2d 142, 150 (N.C. 1980) (rejecting a corporate right to vote).
157 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
158 Id. at 778 n.14 (identifying the right against self-incrimination as purely a personal
right).
159 Id.
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Powell's test is superficially attractive but practically disap-
pointing. First, it is a test in search of a case. With the exception of
Citizens United, the Court seldom reexamines prior corporate consti-
tutional decisions. Instead, the Court's history has been to simply
assert that corporations have a certain constitutional right and then
build doctrine upon that naked declaration.160 Given that the Second
Amendment breaks new constitutional ground, Powell's test is ripe for
a workout. 161
Second, many corporate constitutional rights that predate Bellotti
would probably fail Powell's test if applied today. The Fourth
Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures derive from the Framers' interest in protecting the privacy,
dignity, and security of one's person, house, papers, and effects. 162 The
purpose of the Fourth Amendment points to a purely personal right.
Yet corporations can claim some, although not all, Fourth
Amendment protections to the same degree as natural persons.163 The
Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protects a person from
twice risking "life or limb,"'1 64 and shields the individual from the anx-
160 In Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), the Court held that private corpo-
rations have rights to equal protection. Chief Justice Waite declared:
The court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provi-
sion in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State
to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,
applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.
Id. at 396. Subsequent decisions have built upon this raw ipse dixit, such as S. Ry. v.
Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910) (citing Santa Clara to show that corporations are entitled
to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment) and Covington & Lexington
Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 591 (1896) (same), much to the consternation
of the late Justice Douglas, among others. See Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562, 576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]here was no history, logic, or
reason given [in Santa Clara] to support [the] view" that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Krannich, supra note 138, at 96
(noting this tendency to build upon older cases).
161 See infra part III.A (using Bellotti to evaluate the Second Amendment).
162 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.").
163 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 178-79 (3d ed.
2005) (noting "personality"-centered nature of corporate criminal liability and defenses);
Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 793, 798 n.19 (1996) (criticizing incoherence of this approach).
164 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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iety of future and successive prosecutions. 165 Yet this clause protects
corporations that possess neither life nor limb nor anxieties.166
Third, Powell's test suggests a binary that the existing doctrine
does not support. According to Bellotti, a constitutional provision pro-
tects a corporation, or it does not. But Powell's formula does not cap-
ture those rights that corporations may claim to some lesser degree
than a natural person, such as the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the right to privacy, or, until recently, the right to polit-
ical speech.
Fourth, Powell's test obscures unstated assumptions about corpo-
rate personality. 167 Corporations are treated as natural persons for
some constitutional purposes, as aggregates of natural persons for
others, and as neither aggregates nor natural persons for yet others.1 68
But, as Peter Henning has observed, "short of... announcing a test
for what constitutes an individual non-corporate right,"' 69 there is no
way of knowing what rights are "'purely' personal" or "somewhat
personal.' u7 0
Finally, in operation, Bellotti creates a rebuttable presumption in
favor of corporate constitutional rights. Corporations are constitu-
tional persons, equal to human beings, unless for reasons of nature,
history, or purpose, they are something less. This itself is a startling
baseline from which to begin. Further, it remains unclear what textual,
historical, intentional, or prudential concerns count as an adequate
rationale to rebut this presumption. 171
165 See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (explaining the purpose of
the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause).
166 See Henning, supra note 163, at 841-43; Krannich, supra note 138, at 105. But see
United States v. Hosp. Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 1978) (recognizing that
"corporations do not have human emotions" but finding that double jeopardy protects
against loss of good will in the marketplace).
167 See Mayer, supra note 138, at 650 (observing that "sub silentio the corporation is
legitimated as a constitutional actor" through equating corporations with persons).
168 See id. at 580-81.
169 Henning, supra note 163, at 798 n.19.
170 Id.
171 Consider that Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens both examined the text and original
understanding of the First Amendment in Citizens United and came to different conclu-
sions. Stevens assumed that because business corporations were not widespread in 1791,
the Ratifiers could not have understood the First Amendment text to protect them, at least
to the same extent as natural persons. Justice Scalia looked at the same history and
assumed that any collection of individual human beings was protected, whether joined
together into a separate corporate person or not. Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 925-29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that individuals working through
corporate form have First Amendment protection), with id. at 949-50 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (stating that corporations would not have been understood as within scope of First
Amendment protections); see also Rivard, supra note 137, at 1463 n.153 (calling this pre-
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Even if one rebuts the presumption of equal constitutional rights
for corporations and human beings, what are the consequences? Is a
corporate person bereft of rights, as in the case of the right against
self-incrimination? Is a corporate person given some lesser degree of
rights, as in the case of searches and seizures? And what constitutional
methodology empowers the Court to grant "corporate persons" rights
in some lesser measure than natural persons? 172
Powell's test disguises the question that Justice Ginsburg raises
but does not answer in Citizens United: namely, when does the
Constitution protect associations of natural persons acting through the
corporate form? Powell's formulation, while an important starting
point, eventually must be refined to address the fundamental ques-
tions raised by large intermediary organizations in our constitutional
rights structure. I will revisit this issue in Part IV.
B. Theories of Corporate Personhood and Their Influence on
Corporate Constitutional Rights
The Court has no systematic jurisprudence for corporate constitu-
tional rights because it has no systematic jurisprudence for corporate
personhood. Broadly stated, corporate personhood falls into three
models: the artificial entity theory, 173 the real entity theory,174 and the
aggregate entity theory.175 These three models are the product of a
dialectic between judges, who patched together corporate law from
the corpus of eighteenth century common law,176 and scholars, who
wanted to invigorate that doctrine with a simulacrum of internal
coherence. 177
sumption of constitutional personhood "conclusory"). See generally Marcantel, supra note
136 (discussing the original understanding of corporations).
172 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (holding that the First Amendment forbids
granting corporations some lesser rights to political speech than natural persons). But see
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-54 (1950) (holding that corporations
have lesser Fourth Amendment protections because of their corporate nature).
173 This theory is also known as the fictional, concessionary, or grant theory of the
corporation.
174 The real entity theory is also known as the natural entity theory. This Article will use
real entity, rather than natural entity, to distinguish a corporation from a natural person (a
human being).
175 This is sometimes referred to as the aggregation or contractarian theory of the corpo-
ration. Professor Avi-Yonah has remarked on the stability of these categories of corporate
personality theory throughout the generations. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United
and the Corporate Form, 2010 Wisc. L. REV. 999, 1001.
176 FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 137.
177 See Charles D. Watts, Jr., Corporate Legal Theory Under the First Amendment:
Bellotti and Austin, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 323 (1991) (noting the evolution of corpo-
rate theory "[a]s social, political, economic, and doctrinal circumstances change"). See gen-
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Recently, the Court has tried to run away from corporate person-
ality theory in constitutional cases.178 This effort has met with little
success. Part of the Court's challenge is the mechanism of constitu-
tional reasoning itself. Whether a corporation enjoys some, none, or
all of the benefits of a constitutional right depends in large part on the
theoretical assumptions the Court makes about corporate personality.
But those assumptions are themselves informed by earlier Court deci-
sions. In this way, precedent based on corporate personality theory
tends to shape the constitutional analysis at the outset. Once a corpo-
ration is deemed a person for one right, reason demands an explana-
tion why it is not a person for another. Moreover, corporate
personality theory tends to legitimate the Court's ultimate decision
about a corporate constitutional right by situating the decision within
an existing corpus of jurisprudence respecting persons.
So although the Court is pragmatically averse to theories of cor-
porate personhood, artificial, natural, or aggregate entity theories of
the corporation become constitutional doctrine by necessary infer-
ence, if not by express adoption.1 79 The Court's avoidance of corpo-
rate personality does not make the issue disappear; it simply becomes
a judicial silence, pregnant with implication. 180
The balance of this section will explain the history of these three
theories; how courts have justified decisions using their reasoning; the
problems the theories of corporate personhood try to solve; and the
problems they create. Part III then demonstrates how these three
types of corporate personality theory may influence the Court's
erally Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1985).
178 See Mayer, supra note 138, at 643-44 (noting that the Court has abandoned corpo-
rate personhood theory in favor of an amendment's purpose). This is precisely what the
Court attempted to do in Citizens United.
179 Normative claims of how a corporation should be treated rely on descriptive assump-
tions of the nature of the corporation. This is the corollary to David Millon's observation
that descriptive assertions of what a corporation is anchor normative claims of how it
should be treated. David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2
STANFORD AGORA: AN ONLINE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 39, 40-41 (2001)
[hereinafter Millon, Ambiguous Significance] (discussing the legitimate role of the corpo-
rate personality theory); see also Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the
Corporation, 4 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 95, 96 (1995) (noting that although issues related to
constitutional limits on government power over corporations "generally have been
examined through the broad lens of constitutional law, their resolution has in fact often
depended on how the corporation is characterized").
180 The benefit of this approach is flexibility and partial insulation from the vagaries of
state incorporation law and corporate theory. Its defect is that it splinters the inquiry into a
case-by-case, clause-by-clause analysis that offers little in the way of predictive value or
coherence. Cf. Krannich, supra note 138, at 62-63 (arguing that the Court's corporate con-
stitutional jurisprudence based on past decisions is unstable, "for corporate theory itself is
unstable").
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approach to corporate Second Amendment challenges to the specific
regulations outlined in Part I.
1. The Artificial Entity Theory
a. History
The artificial entity theory of the corporation governed American
jurisprudence from the Founding to the mid-nineteenth century.181
The theory posits that corporations could not exist but for state grant
or concession. They are creatures of sovereign dispensation. 182 Origi-
nally, the sovereign dispensed this grant in exchange for a commit-
ment to operate the corporation for some public good or benefit.18 3
Such exchanges were commonplace and accepted. Since grant of a
corporate charter and its benefits, including, eventually, limited lia-
bility and immortality, 184 were acts of government beneficence, "the
state had the right to extract a price. ' '185
Private corporations could claim constitutional rights only to
those things that inhered in the corporate form itself, particularly
property. In a famous passage from Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,186 Chief Justice Marshall described a corporation as "an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contempla-
tion of law."'187 The corporation "possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
181 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 129-31 (discussing the history of corpora-
tions as special charters from the state).
182 See, e.g., id. at 129 (noting that early corporate charters were rare "grants of
authority from the sovereign"); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & FRANK
PARTNOY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES
112 (11th ed. 2010) (noting that under English law only the sovereign could charter corpo-
rations); Victor Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights Under the First
Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 235 (1981) (noting the evolution of the business corpora-
tion from its origins as "an entity that the state allowed to be created only as a special
privilege").
183 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 131 (noting that early corporations "were
chartered to do work that was traditionally public" and "tended to vest exclusive control
over a public asset, a natural resource, or a business opportunity in one group of favorites
or investors"); KLEIN, COFFEE & PARTNOY, supra note 182, at 1113 ("Occasionally, the
corporation would be required to aid specific charities or other public purposes as a condi-
tion of its existence."); Horwitz, supra note 177, at 181 (noting public purpose of early
corporations).
184 These benefits did not always obtain. Early corporate law rejected limited liability
and eternal life. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 131.
185 Id. at 132.
186 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
187 Id. at 636 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Marshall's difficulties in squaring
corporate theory with the demands of constitutional diversity jurisdiction, see Avi-Yonah,
supra note 175, at 1005-08.
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incidental to its very existence."1 8 8 Moreover, the state could
"reserve" power, and forbid the corporation from operating outside
its charter. 189
The corporation did not completely lack constitutional protec-
tion.190 Dartmouth College, after all, concluded that the corporation
was protected by the Contracts Clause. It would be illogical for the
sovereign to permit a private corporation to form without also
allowing it to possess and protect the property that motivated its for-
mation. 191 But no corporation could lay claim to intangible or liberty
interests like free speech, privacy, personal security, and those "privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men. ' 192 Those rights were reserved for
human beings. As Justice Harlan summarized in 1906, liberty means
"the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons. ' 193
188 Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (lWheat.) at 636.
189 Id. at 712 (Story, J., concurring) (discussing the authority of the state to reserve con-
tractual powers from corporations through chartering); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Why
Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 183, 209 (2004) (noting that even retroactive reser-
vations were permitted); G. Edward White, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV.
1, 8 n.27 (2006) (discussing the power of state to reserve rights).
190 The Dartmouth case is cited both by those who support the artificial entity theory
and by those who see it as a vindication of the aggregate theory right to contract. See Liam
S6amus O'Melinn, Neither Contract nor Concession: The Public Personality of the
Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 207 & n.27 (2006) (noting these differing
interpretations).
191 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that regulation of a
coal company's coal mining activity under Pennsylvania act could be so pervasive as to
constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment); Coleman & Williams, Ltd. v. Wis. Dep't
of Workforce Dev., 401 F. Supp. 2d 938, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (*With respect to the Due
Process Clause, the Court has long considered the property interests of corporations to be
entitled to constitutional protection."); see also First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 824 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen a State creates a corporation with
the power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees that the
corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process of law.").
192 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court has not settled on a defini-
tive list of liberty interests, although the Meyer Court identifies the "right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowl-
edge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the
dictates of his own conscience .... " Id. One might also add "specific freedoms protected
by the Bill of Rights [including the First and Second Amendments]" and "the liberty spe-
cially protected by the Due Process Clause includ[ing] the rights ... to marital privacy, to
use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion." 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional
Law § 609 (2009).
193 Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (holding that the liberty
referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to an insurance company).
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b. Application
Stray references to artificial entity theory still litter the doc-
trine.194 But outside of a few select areas-the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination being the most pertinent' 95-the Court
seldom denies constitutional protection on the basis of corporate arti-
ficiality. 196 Instead, remnants of artificial entity theory manifest as bal-
ancing tests. Today, the corporate form legitimates the level, rather
than the existence, of many corporate constitutional protections.
An example of this "artificial-entity-lite" is Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce.197 Prior to its abrogation by Citizens
United, Austin held that corporations enjoy less core First
Amendment protection than natural persons. 198 As the Court
observed, state law "grants corporations special advantages-such as
limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
194 This is especially true in the privileges or immunities analysis, which has implications
for the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against state governments. See, e.g., Hague v.
Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939) (Roberts, J.) (plurality opinion) ("Natural
persons, and they alone, are entitled to the privileges and immunities which Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment secures for 'citizens of the United States."'); Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (stating that privileges or immunities belong "only to
natural persons" and not to corporations); W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486,
493 (7th Cir. 1984) ("An unincorporated association is not a natural person, and for most
purposes not a citizen. Any legal protection it enjoys is, as with corporations, a matter of
the state's grace.").
195 In Hale v. Henkel, the Court initially dodged the question of personhood, then
forged ahead:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated
for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and
franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations
of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to
it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers.... While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating
questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a
corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show
its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99,
105 (1988) (noting Hale's reliance on the artificiality of the corporation); Susanna K.
Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 118 n.75 (2009)
(discussing Hale).
196 Not even Justice Stevens in his Citizens United dissent depended on the artificiality
of the corporation, recognizing that "many legal scholars have long since rejected the con-
cession theory of the corporation." Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 952 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876.
198 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (acknowledging a line of cases that permitted
restrictions on political speech "based on a speaker's corporate identity").
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accumulation and distribution of assets." 199 The state has a compelling
interest in ensuring that a corporation, with its state-created ability to
concentrate power in the economic marketplace, does not use that
same ability to "distort[ ]" the political marketplace. 2 0 In the corpo-
rate speech context, the recurrent image is that of a corporation, cre-
ated by positive law, and protected in its acquisition of financial and
political influence, becoming a Frankenstein's monster capable of
devouring good government. The Court rejected these "Frankenstein"
rationales in Citizens United.20 1
Outside the First Amendment context, corporations enjoy less
constitutional protection than natural persons. As discussed below, in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, corporations have some protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 20 2 But Fourth Amendment
notions like "expectations of privacy" or "dignity" strain the fictional
language used to describe corporations. So, rather than say that a cor-
poration has no expectation of privacy, the Court has held that corpo-
rations, as artificial entities, expect less privacy than a natural person.
In United States v. Morton Salt Co.,203 for example, the Court stated
that "corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoy-
ment of a right to privacy. '20 4
A variant of the artificial entity theory categorizes some busi-
nesses as "pervasively regulated" 20 5 and accords them less Fourth
Amendment protection than natural persons. In United States v.
Biswell,20 6 the Court held that firearms dealers have less Fourth
Amendment protection than other market participants. Justice White,
writing for the Court, held that the "pervasive[ ] regulat[ion]" of fire-
arms dealers meant that the government could conduct a warrantless
199 Austin, 494 U.S. at 658-59.
200 Id. at 659-60 (citing the risk that "'resources amassed in the economic market-
place"' will give corporations "'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace"' (citation
omitted)).
201 Compare Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899, 900 (finding that corporations are no
different than humans with respect to political speech), with First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) ("The State need not permit its
own creation to consume it."), and Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) ("Such is the Frankenstein monster which States have created by their cor-
poration laws."). Cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 109, 122 n.79 (1992) (discussing the use of this monstrous image).
202 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (stating that a chem-
ical company has a "reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the
interior of its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is
prepared to observe," but holding that the search was reasonable).
203 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
204 Id. at 652.
205 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
206 Id. at 311.
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search of a pawn shop under the federal Gun Control Act of 1968.207
The majority acknowledged that the historical roots of federal regula-
tion of firearms were thin,20 8 but concluded that the government had
"large interests" in ensuring firearms were distributed through "reg-
ular channels" in a "traceable manner" to prevent their sale to "unde-
sirable customers. '20 9 According to the Court, the entire regulatory
regime of firearms licensing and inspection would be imperiled by the
burden of a warrant.21 0
In California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,211 the Court upheld finan-
cial institution reporting requirements against a Fourth Amendment
challenge by reference to corporate artificiality. Then-Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reminded the objecting banks that
they operated as "artificial entities. ' 212 As such, they could have no
equality of rights of privacy with natural persons. 213 The Court con-
cluded that "[w]e have no difficulty ... in determining that the ...
[reporting] requirements.., abridge no Fourth Amendment right of
the banks themselves. '214 "[N]either [corporations] nor unincorpo-
rated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their
affairs in secret. ' '21 5
In sum, the artificial entity theory is enervated, but it is not
extinct. It is a doctrinal device that the Court uses to justify regulation
of corporations to a degree different than individuals. Because a cor-
poration could not exist but for state law, the state may burden its
activity to a greater degree than it could an individual human being.216
This "greater includes the lesser" rationale is neither ironclad nor
207 Id. at 316.
208 Id. at 315 ("Federal regulation of the interstate traffic in firearms is not as deeply
rooted in history as is governmental control of the liquor industry."). Whether this charac-
terization is historically accurate is a separate point.
209 Id. at 315-16. There is a serious tension between this opinion and the Court's insis-
tence that the balancing of government interests play no part in Second Amendment adju-
dication. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (rejecting the use
of balancing tests for Second Amendment rights).
210 Id. at 316. The pawn shop owner had only limited expectations of privacy, knowing
that dealing in firearms is "pervasively regulated." Id.; see also Colonnade Catering Corp.
v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75 (1970) (holding that alcohol is a pervasively regulated
industry which allows for a lesser amount of Fourth Amendment protection than in other
areas).
211 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
212 Id. at 66.
213 Id. at 65.
214 Id. at 66.
215 Id. at 66-67 (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)).
216 For a discussion of unconstitutional conditions and corporate law, see RICHARD A.
EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 113-15 (1993).
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uncontroversial, 217 but it exists. Operationally, the Court seems to
focus on the artificiality of the corporation to justify an interest-
balancing approach that the current Court's emphasis on historically-
defined categories and clear rules would otherwise reject.218
2. The Real Entity Theory
a. History
Artificial entity theory fared poorly from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury on. Legions of Andrew Jackson-era reformers viewed state char-
tering as a fen of influence-peddling, graft, and monopoly.219 State
after state reformed their corporate laws in favor of "free incorpora-
tion" to avoid the corruption created by state chartering.220 Simulta-
neously, jurists and political theorists began to see incorporation less
as a special benefit conferred by the state, and more as a natural way
that individuals organize their personal and economic lives.221
Jacksonian free incorporation and Gilded Age economics placed
enormous pressure on the existing common law doctrines of the busi-
ness association. 222 The common law, with its focus on the individual
shopkeeper or family partnership, did not fit neatly with the reality of
the new and rapidly growing business model.223 This is because the
law had to address three interrelated developments: first, corporations
had become ubiquitous and economically powerful;224 second, share-
217 Id. (arguing against the "greater includes lesser" argument as applied to First
Amendment speech).
218 See infra Part IV (discussing the challenge posed by corporations to originalist and
textualist constitutional methodologies).
219 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 181; see also KLEIN, COFFEE & PARTNOY, supra note
182, at 114 (noting that the special chartering of corporations by the legislature tended to
invite corruption).
220 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 181; see also KLEIN, COFFEE & PARTNOY, supra note
182, at 114 ("[E]qual access to corporate chartering swept through many states, at roughly
the same time that the Jacksonian reform era was seeking to eliminate other special
privileges.").
221 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 181 (discussing this change in attitude); Gregory A.
Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1441,1454 (1987) ("Free incorporation ... suggested that the corporate form
was an individual's natural tool, as useful a device for independence and growth as a
farmer's plow."). The unintended consequence of Jacksonian reform was that by severing
the corporation from sovereign grant, it simultaneously loosed corporations from their
civic obligations. Freeing the corporation from public corruption also freed it from public
conscience. Id. at 1454.
222 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 181-82, 184-85.
223 Mark, supra note 221, at 1445, 1464-65. See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 137
("For all practical purposes, the courts created a body of corporation law out of next to
nothing.").
224 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 163, at 137, 390-91 (discussing the increasing availability
of the corporate form and the wealth of corporate owners during the nineteenth century).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
GUNS, INC
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
holders owned the corporation but were not individually liable for its
debts or torts;225 third, as corporations grew in size, shareholders
owned, but did not actually control, the corporation.226
Real entity theory helped resolve this trio of interpretive chal-
lenges. First, to solve the problem of corporate ubiquity and power,
real entity theorists came to perceive corporations as merely the nat-
ural consequence of group dynamics. 227 People associate for various
reasons-ethnic, religious, economic, familial. 228 However, these
groups are not explicable as the total of the individual preferences,
privileges, or rights of each group's members. 229 Real entity scholars
applied this insight to corporate law. To them, a corporation was
something other than its shareholders. It was real, like a family or a
congregation. And it was real in a way that was not explainable as the
sum of its parts. The only question was whether the law would recog-
nize it as such.230
225 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 183-85, 205 (explaining the problems that arise from
this form of limited liability).
226 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 206 (noting that even in late 1800s it was becoming
apparent that management controlled the corporation). As David Millon put it, "[i]f a
mere majority could bind a dissenting minority, 'the corporate will' had to mean something
other than the actual consent of the [shareholders]." David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 215. See generally Mark, supra note 221 (discussing
these conceptual problems).
227 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 177, at 197 (noting that some turn-of-the-twentieth-
century scholars saw "the large industrial corporation [as], in short, a natural reflection of
the rational economic tendency toward combination").
228 As Victor Morawetz explained:
The conception of a number of individuals as a corporate or collective entity
occurs in the earliest stages of human development, and is essential to many of
the most ordinary processes of thought. Thus, the existence of tribes, village
communities, families, clans, and nations implies a conception of these several
bodies of individuals as entities having corporate rights and attributes .... So,
in numberless other instances, associations which are not legally incorporated
are considered as personified entities, acting as a unit and in one name; for
example, political parties, societies, committees, courts.
1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1 (2d ed.
1886); see also Mark, supra note 221, at 1469 ("[Tjhe organicists saw society as a collection
of collectivities, each a legitimate outgrowth of individuals united for purposes of their
own.").
229 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 185-86, 205-07 (discussing the rise and fall of the
legal movement to treat corporations as merely unincorporated partnerships of
shareholders).
230 See Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253, 257-62
(1911) (arguing that corporations-like houses, churches, and schools-are distinct entities
which are greater than the sum of their aggregate parts and that "[a]ll that the law can do is
to recognize, or refuse to recognize, the existence of this entity"); Horwitz, supra note 177,
at 220 (noting the turn-of-century legal movement to treat corporations as organic beings
greater than sum of parts (citing W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and
the State, 21 L.Q.R. 365, 379 (1905))).
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Conceptualizing the corporation as a real entity, separate from its
owners, helped resolve the second interpretive problem: the fact that
a corporation assumed the liability of its owners for debts and torts.
Because courts came to treat the corporation as a separate entity, it
meant that the corporation, not the individual owners, was liable for
breach of its duties. 231 But the flipside of duty is right.232 Therefore, in
the same way the corporation came to have duties independent of its
owners, it also came to have rights independent of them.233
Finally, real entity theory resolved the problem of the separation
of ownership and control. It did so by the simple expedient of
ascribing the "will" of the corporation to the "will" of the controlling
forces within the corporation-typically, its managers.234
In this way, real entity theory responded to the practical and doc-
trinal challenges of the corporate form, but not without cost. Infusing
the corporation with life depended upon a precarious stack of legal
fictions: that the corporation was an independent person, that it had
dignity, and that it had a mind and feelings and motives and rights.
b. Application
Real entity theory offers corporations the fullest protection under
the Constitution. When the Constitution says persons, it means per-
sons. Corporations are persons for purposes of due process and equal
protection analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
231 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 185, 205 (highlighting Chief Justice Roger Taney and
corporate theorist Henry 0. Taylor's concern that limited liability would vanish if corpora-
tions were not entities). Cf. Mark, supra note 221, at 1473 (noting that the right of limited
liability inheres in a corporation and not in its constituents).
232 I intentionally use this common image in a less rigorous analytical sense than
Hohfeld. Cf John M. Breen, Neutrality in Liberal Legal Theory and Catholic Legal
Thought, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 513, 537 (2009) (arguing that in a liberal society,
one's rights are other's duties); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31 (1913) (referring to
rights and duties as "correlative[s]"); cf also Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A
Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 372 (2007) ("Persons
have rights, duties, and obligations; things do not.").
233 Cf Millon, Ambiguous Significance, supra note 179, at 44, 46 (noting that as corpo-
rations began being seen as natural entities, they developed special rights and states aban-
doned special corporate regulations).
234 Beveridge v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 19 N.E. 489, 494 (N.Y. 1889) ("The expression of
the corporate will ... may originate with its directors, where the law or the by-laws have
not expressly restricted their authority .... "); see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical
Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social
Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 799-800 (2005) (discussing the rise of the business
judgment test as showing the development of the real entity theory and the deference to
corporate boards); O'Kelley, supra note 138, at 1363 ("If. . . Mobil Oil Corporation pays
for an advertisement that expresses certain social views, the expression involved is not that
of the myriad shareholders, but of the top management of Mobil.").
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each shareholder within the corporation may not suffer an individual
due process or equal protection violation.2 35
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the real entity theory under-
pins corporate rights against compelled speech: a corporation cannot
be forced to associate with speech it finds offensive. 236 In Pacific Gas
and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, a plu-
rality of the Court held that a state could not compel Pacific Gas, a
highly regulated utility company, to include the messages of third
party consumer groups in Pacific Gas billing envelopes.237 The Court
analogized the corporation to a religious objector who found the
mandatory display of "Live Free Or Die" on his license plate an
affront to his conscience. 238 Among the Court's reasons for striking
down the rule was the belief that "If]or corporations as for individuals,
the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say. '239
235 Similarly, a corporation is viewed as a separate entity for purposes of the Article III
citizenship clause, without regard to the fact that it may contain shareholders of any
number of states or countries. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1187-88 (2010)
(showing the development of the doctrine that a corporation is a citizen of the state where
it is incorporated and has its principal place of business for jurisdiction purposes). Some
commentators dispute the view that granting Fourteenth Amendment rights to corpora-
tions depends on corporate personhood. See O'Kelley, supra note 138, at 1356 (identifying
the view that corporate rights are coextensive with the aggregate of shareholders' rights).
See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the establishment of
corporate Fourteenth Amendment rights.
236 Compare Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (holding that California cannot force a private utility company to use
space in its billing envelopes to transmit messages from groups with which it disagrees),
and John C. Coats IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: Revival of an
Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 806, 827 (1989) ("At work here is the conception of the
corporation as a natural entity having rights, including free speech, which demand the
courts' protection." (discussing Pacific Gas)), with Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713
(1977) (finding that the government cannot criminally sanction a New Hampshire driver
for obscuring "Live Free Or Die" motto on his license plate, which he found offensive).
237 Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 5, 12-13 (plurality opinion). The Court's reasoning did not
turn on a First Amendment forum analysis of the envelope. See id. at 17.
238 See id. (comparing the then-present situation to that described in Wooley, 430 U.S. at
705).
239 Id. at 16 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)).
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Despite sharp criticism,240 this argument still animates corporate First
Amendment jurisprudence.24'
Corporations also possess some moral right to privacy under the
Fourth Amendment, even if it is to some lesser measure than natural
persons.242 In Hale v. Henkel,243 the Court held that a corporation
possesses some protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures.244 Hale involved a subpoena directed to a corporate agent
which required him to disclose certain business materials as part of an
antitrust investigation. 245 The agent asserted both a Fourth
Amendment claim that the subpoena was an unreasonable search and
a Fifth Amendment claim that the corporation did not have to incrim-
inate itself.246 The Court held that the Fourth Amendment protected
corporations against unreasonably broad subpoenas,247 as a "corpora-
tion is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed
name and with a distinct legal entity. ' 248 The Court bolstered its con-
clusion by observing that corporations also enjoy rights to just com-
pensation for takings, due process, and equal protection.249 The Court
pronounced this tautology for its conclusion: "[In organizing itself as
240 Then-Justice Rehnquist dissented in Pacific Gas. According to Rehnquist, business
corporations cannot claim a negative free speech right, any more than they can claim a
right to remain silent or a right to privacy, the "two constitutional liberties most closely
analogous to the right to refrain from speaking." Id. at 32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist pounced on the Court's invocation of a real entity theory of the corpora-
tion. In his view, it was ridiculous to talk of a corporation as having a "mind," a "con-
science," and a need for "self-expression," because such discussion simply "confuse[s]
metaphor with reality." Id. at 33.
241 See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding that forcing retailers and manufacturers to place warning labels on violent or sex-
ually explicit video games was compelled speech which was not narrowly tailored); cf. Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655-56 (2000) (holding that the federally chartered
nonprofit corporation, Boy Scouts, has a First Amendment right of expressive association
despite dissenters within its corporate structure).
242 See supra notes 202-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of privacy. See supra
notes 164-66 and accompanying text and infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text for a
discussion of double jeopardy.
243 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
244 See Horwitz, supra note 177, at 182 (arguing that Hale used natural entity theory to
extend Fourth Amendment protections to corporations). But see Henning, supra note 163,
at 819 n.116 (arguing that Hale did not in fact adopt any theory of corporate form to decide
the case); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justice's Privilege Waiver
Policy and the Death of Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57
DEPAUL L. REV. 329, 351 (2008) (arguing that the Hale ruling is based on practical con-
cerns rather than on the concept of a corporation).
245 Hale, 201 U.S. at 44-46.
246 Id. at 70-71.
247 Id. at 75-76.
248 Id. at 76. An aggregate approach to the corporate form is apparent in this line as
well.
249 Id.
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a collective body [a corporation] waives no constitutional immunities
appropriate to such body. 250
Post-Hale, the Court has extended Fourth Amendment protec-
tions for corporations in terms more appropriate for human beings. In
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,251 an Idaho corporation2 52 sued to enjoin
the Occupational Safety an Health Administration (OSHA) from con-
ducting a warrantless search of its premises.2 53 The Court concluded
that warrantless administrative searches were not permitted outside
the heavily regulated industries of liquor and firearms.254 "The
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial build-
ings as well as private homes. ' 255 Privacy is violated regardless of
whether the search is in a home or in a business, or whether the gov-
ernment's motivation is criminal or civil.256 The fact that the corpora-
tion had no expectation of privacy from the eyes of its employees did
not "throw[] open th[ose] areas . . . to the warrantless scrutiny of
Government agents. ' 257 Presumably, the corporation's reasonable
expectation of privacy mirrored that of a family, in that opening the
doors to corporate agents, like opening the doors to family members,
did not diminish the reasonable expectation of privacy of the
corporation.258
In United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., the Court justified
protection for corporations under the Fifth Amendment Double
Jeopardy Clause in part because of the "embarrassment," 259 "anx-
iety, '260 and "personal strain" 26' that the threat of successive prosecu-
250 Id.
251 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
252 Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 438 (D. Idaho 1976) (describing the plain-
tiff as an "Idaho corporation in good standing").
253 Although the Supreme Court says that the corporation's president, Mr. Barlow,
refused admission of the OSHA officer and subsequently asserted his own personal Fourth
Amendment rights, Marshall, 436 U.S. at 310, it is apparent from the lower court ruling on
the plaintiff corporation's Fourth Amendment challenge that the corporation was also
attempting to claim Barlow's personal rights, Barlow's, 424 F. Supp. at 439.
254 See Marshall, 436 U.S. at 313 (exempting pervasively regulated businesses from the
search warrant requirement).
255 Marshall, 436 U.S. at 311.
256 Id. at 312.
257 Id. at 315.
258 Cf. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (finding that the corpora-
tion had a reasonable expectation of privacy within its covered buildings); United States v.
Jamieson-McKames Pharm., Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 542-43 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the co-
partner in a corporation had the apparent authority to consent to search).
259 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) (quoting Green
v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).
260 Id.
261 Id. (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 86:887
October 2011]
tion places on a defendant.2 62 The fact that such emotive terms seem
misplaced when applied to a legal construct did not prevent their use
in the Court's decision. 263
Real entity theory solved the problem of fitting the corporation
into the common law system, but it did so at a price. The price was the
heavy strain that constitutional adjudication placed on the per-
sonhood metaphor once corporate rights transitioned from property
to liberty. Real entity theory compels the Court to speak of a corpora-
tion as if it had a "soul to... damn[ ]" and a "body to... kick[ ].-264
But the more the Court treats a corporation as real, the less real it
seems to be.265
Recognizing this strain, the Court's modern tendency is to con-
centrate on the scope of the constitutional right, rather than on corpo-
rate personality.2 66 However, focusing on the right rather than the
litigant trends toward a "real entity by default" theory of the corpora-
tion.267 Under this modern twist, a corporation possesses all of the
constitutional rights of a natural person, except when it doesn't. But
what counts as a showing that a corporation is a special category of
"person" without equal claim to a constitutional right is not clear.
According to Citizens United, the lack of textual or historical refer-
ences to the rights of corporations is insufficient.268
Whatever the required quantum of historical or jurisprudential
proof, once the Court suggests that a constitutional right protects a
corporation to some different degree than that of a natural person, the
analysis reverts to some measure of artificial entity theory of corpo-
rate constitutional rights. Alternatively, once the Court views a corpo-
262 See United States v. Hosp. Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 335 (1st Cir. 1978)
(finding that corporations "suffer" and are "made very insecure" due to the "stigma" of
conviction).
263 See Henning, supra note 163, at 854 ("Anthromorphizing an entity in order to stretch
the Double Jeopardy Clause rings hollow ....").
264 John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981)
(quoting a remark by Edward, First Baron Thurlow).
265 Felix Cohen's famous essay exposed the circularity of corporate personhood meta-
phors. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 813-14 (1935).
266 See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1020 (noting this avoidance).
267 See United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir.
1979) ("The Supreme Court generally has considered issues of the application of constitu-
tional rights to corporations in negative terms: asking whether corporate status should
defeat an otherwise valid claim of right." (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978))); see also Rivard, supra note 137, at 1463 n.153 (suggesting that
Rad-O-Lite adopted a modified real entity approach).
268 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(rejecting a different First Amendment analysis for corporations).
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ration as a real entity standing in equal position to human beings, the
corporation's composite and fictional character becomes constitution-
ally invisible.
3. The Aggregation Theory
a. History
The Gilded Age produced the aggregation theory as an alterna-
tive to the artificial entity theory of the corporation. 269 In an 1882
opinion called Railroad Tax Cases, Justice Field, riding circuit, held
that corporations can claim equal protection and due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment-not because corporations have rights in
themselves, but because corporations represent the aggregation of
natural persons that have Fourteenth Amendment rights. 270 Acknowl-
edging Dartmouth College, Justice Field recognized that "[p]rivate
corporations are ... artificial persons," 271 but then quickly penetrated
this legal veneer. Except for sole corporations, a corporation "con-
sist[s] of aggregations of individuals united for some legitimate
business."272
Justice Field thought it would be intolerable that "a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial
and discriminating legislation by the states" should end "the moment
the person becomes a member of a corporation. 2 73 Instead, a court
should hold that whenever a constitutional provision guarantees per-
sons "the enjoyment of property, or... [a] means for its protection, or
prohibits legislation injuriously affecting it, [then] the benefits of the
provision extend to corporations. 2 74 Justice Field promised "that the
courts will always look beyond the name of the artificial being to the
individuals whom it represents. '275
Modern aggregate theory views corporations as individual rights
holders "acting through fiduciaries. '276 Corporations are neither fic-
tions nor real entities, but a "nexus" or "web" of contracts between
269 For an overview of the nineteenth century history of aggregation theory, see
Horwitz, supra note 177, at 177-78 and Millon, Ambiguous Significance, supra note 179, at
41.
270 13 F. 722, 743 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
271 Id.
272 Id. Justice Field also offered an encomium to the corporate form, listing all the ways
in which corporations advance our material and moral welfare. Id. at 744 ("Indeed, there is
nothing which is lawful to be done ... to enrich and ennoble humanity, which is not to a
great extent done through the instrumentalities of corporations.").
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Millon, supra note 226, at 224.
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free and independent individuals who make choices dictated by his or
her own utility calculus.277 To work, aggregation theories replace real
entity notions like "will" or "anxiety" with normative judgments
about unconstitutional conditions and freedom of contract. A corpo-
ration does not have to exist, but if it does, the government cannot
condition its existence on the surrender of certain constitutional rights
within its web of contracts. 278
The moral assumptions of aggregation theory can be either
strongly libertarian-that interference with corporate constitutional
rights is tantamount to interfering with liberty of contract or with sub-
stantive due process279-or looser-that corporations, like other insti-
tutions, maximize self-realization and fend off totalizing government
and therefore need to be scrupulously protected from government
interference. 280
Under either theory, whether the person's motive to associate is
to promote monetary gain or to act as a "catalyst for self-realization"
(or both), the corporation is usually a "salutary association," formed
by the free will and for the benefit of its contractors and others. 281
Regulation that interferes with those choices-however broadly
defined and for whatever reason-"lack[s] legitimacy" because it
"intrude[s] upon individual autonomy."282
277 Id. at 229-30.
278 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special
advantages[, e.g., limited liability] the forfeiture of First Amendment rights."); Railroad
Tax Cases, 13 F. at 743-44 ("It would be a most singular result if a constitutional provision
intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating legislation by
the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person becomes a
member of a corporation."); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 113-15
(1993) (discussing the protection of corporate First Amendment speech as requiring an
"unconstitutional conditions" analysis); Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The
Constitutional Right That Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 639, 650 (2011) (discussing the free speech benefits of the Lochner era);
Ribstein, supra note 179, at 105-08 (discussing and criticizing Epstein's unconstitutional
conditions model).
279 Millon, Ambiguous Significance, supra note 179, at 53 ("[F]reedom of contract, [is
the] anti-redistributive ideology that lies at the heart of the nexus-of-contracts agenda.").
280 See Martin H. Redish & Howard M. Wasserman, What's Good for General Motors:
Corporate Speech and the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 237
(1998) (arguing that corporate speech is "a form of indirect or catalytic self-realization...
and thus fully consistent with the purposes served by the constitutional protection of
speech"); see also Winkler, supra note 138, at 1268-69 (describing Redish and
Wasserman's view).
281 Adam Winkler uses the terms "contract-based salutary association" and "constitu-
tive salutary association" to distinguish between these wealth- and autonomy-maximizing
conceptions of the corporation. Winkler, supra note 138, at 1266-69. For more on the salu-
tary versus perilous association, see infra Part IV.
282 Millon, supra note 226, at 231 (criticizing this position).
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b. Application
Modern First Amendment jurisprudence embraces some measure
of aggregation theory.283 Citizens United contains understated allu-
sions to the aggregate nature of the corporation: "If the First
Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing
citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political
speech. '28 4 Scalia's concurrence, drawing upon prior decisions, 285 is
more forthright. The First Amendment protects "the speech of many
individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving
the leadership of the party the right to speak on their behalf. '286 In
this view, associating together as a business corporation "is no dif-
ferent" from associating as any other group of rights-holders.287 Those
who do not like the speech are not compelled to join, understand that
managers might speak in ways that the members disapprove of, and
can voluntarily withdraw from the association. 288 As for externali-
ties-such as distortion of the marketplace of ideas by a financially
powerful speaker-the Court says that those are not externalities at
all. According to the Court, the First Amendment codifies a solution
to the risk of concentration of speech: more speech.289
283 Cf Coats, supra note 236, at 815 n.50 ("Under the aggregate theory, the extent to
which a corporation may be said to have 'rights,' especially constitutional rights, corre-
sponds to the rights of the individuals which make it up.").
284 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 904 (2010).
285 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the rights of "[t]hose individuals who form that type of voluntary
association known as a corporation"), abrogated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986) ("Voluntary political associations do
not suddenly present the specter of corruption merely by assuming the corporate form.");
First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 n.34 (1978) (observing that the most
analogous position of those shareholders in a corporation is that of members of a voluntary
association); see also Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance:
Incorporating Corporate Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 31 (2001) (noting that Bellotti "invoked the logic of the aggregation
theory" when it "treat[ed] corporate activity as the product of the individual agreement of
its shareholders").
286 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring).
287 Id.
288 See Austin, 494 U.S. at 686-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that corporate share-
holders freely contract with the knowledge that a corporation may speak in ways they
deplore and that they have right to withdraw their support from the corporation). For an
argument that Citizens United applies a real entity view, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 175, at
1040-45.
289 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 ("[Ilt is our law and our tradition that more speech,
not less, is the governing rule."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) ("[T]he remedy to be applied [to bad speech] is more speech, not enforced
silence."). In this manner, the Court has adopted a kind of neo-liberal approach to the
issue of political speech by corporations. See also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the
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Aggregation theory tries to reap all the benefits of the real entity
theory without all of the metaphorical hocus-pocus. Corporations are
not artificial; they are not real; they are a set of relationships with
which government should not, or constitutionally must not, interfere.
III
CORPORATE SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS
How will the Second Amendment fit into this bric-a-brac of cor-
porate constitutional methodology? The answer depends on two vari-
ables: first, whether the Court concludes that the Second Amendment
right to keep and bear arms is a purely personal right, and second, if
not, whether the Court understands the corporate form to justify any
restrictions on the right. If the Second Amendment is purely personal,
it will not extend to corporations.290 If, however, the Second
Amendment is not purely personal, the Court will have to decide what
effect, if any, the corporate form should have on its scope.
Whether the corporate form affects the scope of the Second
Amendment will require the Court to engage expressly or implicitly
with one of the three theories of corporate personality-artificial, nat-
ural, and aggregate-and the choice may result in different and sur-
prising conclusions.
Part III.A discusses whether the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms is a purely personal right, and concludes that the
better argument is that it is not. Part III.B discusses the effect of cor-
porate theory on the right as applied to the four types of regulation
discussed in Part II.
A. Is the Second Amendment Right "Purely Personal"?: Nature,
History, and Purpose of the Right To Keep and Bear Arms
Despite its flaws, the Court will likely use some form of Justice
Powell's Bellotti test as the threshold inquiry for corporate Second
Amendment rights.29' As Justice Powell instructed, whether or not the
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 829-38 (2008) (discussing the origins of, and flaws
with, the "marketplace of ideas" approach to the First Amendment).
290 In this way, corporations would not have Second Amendment rights just as they do
not have Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.
291 Courts have used Belloni in the past for analyzing other rights. See, e.g.,
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284-85 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using Bellotti to analyze Eighth
Amendment claims made by a corporation); Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471
F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (using Bellotti test to analyze whether a company that
allowed live sex acts could claim a right to privacy); Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of
Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Belloni
regarding the right of a corporation to free exercise of religion); Consol. Edison Co. v.
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right to keep and bear arms for self-defense "is 'purely personal' or is
unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the
nature, history, and purpose of the [Second Amendment]. ' 292 Unfor-
tunately, neither the nature, nor the history, nor the purpose of the
Second Amendment leads to definitive answers. The best that can be
said is that evidence points to some level of a collective Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms in addition to an individual
right.
1. Nature of the Second Amendment
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense is, in its nature, personal. Both Heller and McDonald empha-
size that the "central component" of the Second Amendment right is
individual self-defense, not self-defense through an organized state
militia.2 93 However, simply because the right is personal does not
mean it is purely personal.
The Second Amendment is grounded in moral values of self-
reliance. Guns are symbols of freedom and protected out of "respect
for Lockean values of autonomy and individualism. ' 294 Second
Amendment activists regard the provision as a "pledge" that individ-
uals do not have to surrender their "physical autonomy. '295 And, of
course, allied with this notion of autonomy is self-defense, the "central
component" of the Second Amendment right. 296
The nature of the Second Amendment appears to be personal.297
But is it purely personal? A textual examination suggests perhaps not.
Pataki, 292 F.3d 338, 346-49 (2d Cir. 2002) (using Bellotti test to analyze an attainder
clause challenge); United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719,
742-43 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (using Bellotti to find that a corporation could claim Eighth
Amendment protections).
292 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778-79 n.14 (1978).
293 See supra Part I.B.
294 Green, supra note 106, at 188; see also Robert Weisberg, The Utilitarian and
Deontological Entanglement of Debating Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 333, 337 (2004) (noting the "association of the gun with a form of individual
autonomy" (reviewing GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (Bernard E.
Harcourt ed., 2003))).
295 Clark M. Neily III, The Right To Keep and Bear Arms in the States: Ambiguity, False
Modesty, and (Maybe) Another Win for Originalism, 33 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 185, 193
(2010).
296 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008).
297 Michael Green has suggested that one can describe both the right to bear arms and
the right to remain silent in Lockean terms; he argues that both silence and firearms are
auxiliary rights designed to protect inalienable natural rights. Michael Steven Green,
Paradox of Auxiliary Rights, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 116 (2002) ("The privilege [against self-
incrimination] and the Second Amendment... give individuals the power to defend their
reserved [natural] rights when other forms of legal protection fail."). Green has explored a
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The Second Amendment refers to the right of the "people" to
keep and bear arms. As Akhil Amar has suggested, the Constitution
uses "persons" to refer to individuals and to individual rights, and
"the people" to emphasize collectives. 298 The Second Amendment
speaks of "the people" and of a "militia"; both connote collective or
associative behavior.299 Indeed, some state constitutions contain
Second Amendment analogs that speak of the right to keep and bear
arms to protect oneself and to protect others.300
The right to keep and bear arms appears designed to apply to
"the body of the people, or any single man" when the threat to liberty
is extreme. 30 1 Blackstone referred to the right to bear arms as a "polit-
ical" right.302 It is Reconstruction that transformed the Second
Amendment from a right concerned with the polity to a right prima-
rily, but not exclusively, concerned with the person.30 3
In sum, it seems as if the nature of the Second Amendment right
is not "purely personal," at least as the Court has designated that term
in other provisions. This conclusion is reinforced, but also compli-
cated, by the history of the right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense.
revised position on this point. See Green, supra note 106, at 188 (articulating the right to
keep and bear arms as natural rather than auxiliary).
298 Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term - Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 127 (1999). Note, however, that the doctrine of corpo-
rate constitutional rights has not been consistent in this regard. See supra Part II.A
(detailing inconsistencies in doctrine).
299 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 590 (discussing the protection of Second Amendment
rights for "people's" or "citizens"' militia, as opposed to organized militia). Compare this
to the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, which refers to a "person" and is
self-reflexive, referring to "himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an illuminating discussion
of the autonomy and self-defense values behind both the Second Amendment and Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, see Green, supra note 297.
300 See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights To Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 191,198, 199, 205-07, 216 (2006) (compiling and characterizing state provi-
sions regarding the right to bear arms, including for the protection of other people).
301 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 168, at 87 (C.B. MacPhearson
ed., Hackett 1980) (1690) (emphasis added). Compare this to the more intimate right to
remain silent. The right to remain silent is guaranteed because of the specter of govern-
ment "invad[ing] the [defendant's] mind and tak[ing] dominion of his will." Abe Fortas,
The Fifth Amendment: Nemo Tenetur Prodere Seipsum, 25 CLEV. B. Ass'N J. 91, 98 (1954).
For this reason, it extends to testimonial evidence-evidence procured from the defen-
dant's own mouth. See Green, supra note 297 at 134-41 (discussing the philosophical
grounds for the right against self-incrimination).
302 Green, supra note 297, at 166.
303 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1198, 1261-62 (1992) (discussing this transformation); Miller, supra note 72, at
1330-31 (same).
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2. History of the Second Amendment 3°4
Historically, private collectives and early corporations possessed
some ability to keep and bear arms. The English monarchy granted
charters to venture corporations to settle Virginia and Massachusetts.
In those charters, the corporations possessed authority to keep, trans-
port, and employ arms "for their several defense and safety." 305
English common law protected persons who assembled armed to
defend an owner's house, although they could be charged with riot or
unlawful assembly if they carried their guns outside of the property.30 6
Further, there is historical support that the right to keep arms
extended to one's business. Under some, but not all, common law
decisions, a person was not obliged to retreat to safety when con-
fronted in his business by a stranger but could stand his ground, just as
if he were in his own home. 30 7 Texas, even in the midst of the blood-
304 A full recounting of the history of the Second Amendment has filled many volumes
of law reviews and dominated the debate until very recently. This section cannot survey the
entire literature; instead, it will focus narrowly on the historical evidence for and against
collective arms bearing.
305 The Charter of New England (1620), in 3 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 1835 (1909) [hereinafter COLONIAL CHARTERS] (spelling modern-
ized); see also The First Charter of Virginia (1606), in 7 COLONIAL CHARTERS at 3787
(allowing the company to "transport the goods, chattels, armor, munition[s] and furniture,
needful to be used by them, for.., defense or otherwise in respect of the said plantations"
(spelling modernized)).
306 Compare 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 516
(John Curwood ed., 8th ed. 1824) (1721) ("[A]n assembly of a man's friends in his own
house, for the defence of the possession thereof.., is indulged by law .. "), with Queen
v. Soley, (1707) 88 Eng. Rep. 935, 937 ("Though a man may ride with arms, yet he cannot
take two with him to defend himself, even though his life is threatened; for he is in the
protection of the law, which is sufficient for his defence."). As a writer in an eighteenth-
century magazine stated:
If a man be in his house and hears that others are coming there to beat him, it
is lawful for him to assemble his friends, in his house, for the safety of his
person; but if a man be threatened to be beaten out of his house, it is not
lawful for him to make such assembly; for he hath another remedy by surety of
the peace.
See Cyder-Act Subversive of Civil Liberty, in 33 GENTLEMEN'S MAO. & HIST. CHRON. 447
(Sylvanus Urban ed., 1763) (spelling modernized).
307 See Bryant v. State, 39 So. 2d 657, 658 (Ala. 1949) (finding no duty to retreat from
business); Bean v. State, 8 S.W. 278, 280 (Tex. Ct. App. 1888) (discussing the application of
the right to self-defense in the workplace). But see Perry v. State, 10 So. 650, 652 (Ala.
1892) (suggesting a duty to escape if confronted in cartilage of business); Commonwealth
v. Gagne, 326 N.E.2d 907, 910-11 (Mass. 1975) (declining to craft a business exception to
the duty to retreat). For a compilation of these laws, see Jeffrey F. Ghent, Homicide: Duty
To Retreat as Condition of Self-Defense When One Is Attacked at His Office, or Place of
Business or Employment, 41 A.L.R. 3d 584 (1972).
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shed of Reconstruction, for instance, allowed the carrying of arms on
"one's own premises or place of business. '308
The history of law enforcement also suggests something other
than a purely personal right to keep and bear arms. The professional
police force is a nineteenth century innovation; prior to that, law
enforcement was the responsibility of private30 9 assemblages of armed
citizens. 310 Medieval systems such as the hue and cry and the posse
comitatus were civic obligations, performed by private collectives.311
In the eighteenth century, private interests sometimes pooled
resources to hire patrols, catch thieves, and protect land and game.312
These traditions, with their blurred lines between public and private
collective arms-bearing, were transplanted to the States.313 Later, pri-
vate corporations such as the Pinkerton National Detective Agency
(the Pinkertons) supplied many of the investigatory and protective
services that eventually became the responsibility of the public police
force. These private agencies "maintained private arsenals. ' 314 For
example, in their Chicago office alone, the Pinkertons "kept about 250
rifles and 500 revolvers. '315
Although history is full of examples of private organizations
keeping and bearing arms, historical attitudes toward the prevalence
and presence of such groups, especially in public, have been mixed. In
America, along with the hue and cry and the posse comitatus, there is
a tradition of other, less savory forms of collective arms-bearing that
are hard to distinguish from private police. The slave patrol is one
example. This phenomenon was the product of "informal collabora-
tion of slave owners" 316 exercising what they understood as rights to
308 Act of Apr. 12, 1871, 1911 Tex. Crim. Stat. art. 476.
309 1 use the term "private" guardedly, as the history of policing has been a tension
between purely private self-protective or self-interested behavior and private persons per-
forming public functions. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165, 1195-1201 (1999) (discussing private origins of public policing).
310 JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN
ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 2-3 (1994) (discussing the history of collective self-defense).
311 See FRANK MORN, THE EYE THAT NEVER SLEEPS: A HISTORY OF THE PINKERTON
DETECTIVE AGENCY 2 (1982); Sklansky, supra note 309, at 1195-1200 (discussing early
collective security arrangements).
312 Elizabeth E. Job, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 582,
584 (discussing private prosecution and patrol societies); Sklansky, supra note 309, at
1201-02 (discussing the hiring of game keepers and early London patrols).
313 Sklansky, supra note 309, at 1205.
314 MORN, supra note 311, at 104.
315 Id.
316 See Harry V. Jaffa, Dred Scott Revisited, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 197, 214-15
(2008) (calling such patrols "commonplace" in antebellum America); see also KENNETH M.
STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 189 (1989)
(discussing the activity of slave patrols). Stampp notes that "[g]roups of slaveholders some-
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defend themselves and their property.317 After the abolition of
slavery, private groups of Klansmen rode armed in what they openly
asserted to be protective law enforcement organizations.318 When
prosecuted under anti-Klan legislation, Klan members claimed that
they rode in expression of their natural right to self-defense. 319 And,
of course, collective arms-bearing for self-defense has sometimes been
difficult to distinguish from vigilantism. 320
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, private cor-
porate arms-bearing did not escape the notice of government or the
ire of the American public. The public was not sympathetic to the fact
that Pinkertons possessed so many weapons and deployed force on
behalf of private-usually corporate-interests, as opposed to public
ones.321 Popular distrust of private forces during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries led to regulations and investigations of
these private collectives. 322
times rode through the swamps with their dogs and made the search for fugitives a sport
comparable to fox hunting." Id.
317 Sklansky, supra note 309, at 1209 & n.245 (describing slave patrols modeled on medi-
eval practices). Sometimes the patrol merged with the activities of the militia. See STAMPP,
supra note 316, at 214 (discussing slave patrol as a type of militia activity); Carl T. Bogus,
The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 309, 335-36 (1998)
(observing that slave patrols and militia were largely synonymous in the South).
318 The professed object of the Klan, according to its founding document was "[t]o pro-
tect the weak, the innocent, and the defenseless, from the indignities, wrongs and outrages
of the lawless, the violent, and the brutal." The Ku Klux Klan Organization and Principles
1868, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 500 (Henry Steele Commager
ed., 10th ed. 1988). Or, as former Confederate General John B. Gordon testified before
Congress, the Klan "was simply this-nothing more and nothing less.., an organization, a
brotherhood of the property-holders, the peaceable, law-abiding citizens of the State, for
self-protection. The instinct of self-protection prompted that organization ...." Affairs in
Insurrectionary States: Hearing Before the J. Comm. To Inquire into the Condition of
Affairs in the Late Insurrectionary States, 42d Cong. 308 (1871) (statement of John B.
Gordon). It was, in his words, "purely a police organization to keep the peace." Id. at 309.
319 Counsel for the Klan defendants hoped that the jury would understand that the Klan
was simply part of a natural right to "[b]and ... together as a defense against any such
threats as were apprehended." PROCEEDINGS IN THE Ku KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C.
IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER TERM, 1871, at 425-26 (Ben Pitman
& Louis Freeland Post eds., 1872); see also Saul Cornell & Justin Florence, The Right To
Bear Arms in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment: Gun Rights or Gun Regulation?, 50
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1043, 1063 (2010) (commenting on self-defense arguments of the
Klan during these trials); Miller, supra note 72, at 1332-34, 1347-48 (same).
320 See Joh, supra note 312, at 582-83 (discussing early policing and vigilantism);
Sklansky, supra note 309, at 1209 (same); see also The Army and the Militia, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 1878, at 4 (despairing of "rifle clubs or white leagues, over which the state has no
authority, and which are little better than lawless vigilance committees").
321 See MORN, supra note 311, at 107-08 (discussing anti-Pinkerton laws passed in the
wake of congressional investigation).
322 See MORN, supra note 311, at 107-08, 185-86 (discussing the investigation of private
security and private police); Sklansky, supra note 309, at 1214-19 (discussing federal inves-
tigation and popular sentiment). As a historical matter, the effectiveness of this regulation
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This history suggests that collective arms-bearing for self-defense
is protected, albeit to an unspecified degree. Granted, Heller contains
some imprecise language indicating that private groups associating in
military organizations may be prohibited, at least perhaps when they
assemble in public.323 And certainly, a paramilitary organization and a
compound of persons engaged in collective security could be hard to
distinguish from each other. But a blanket prohibition on all private
collective self-defense would run counter to at least one line of
Anglo-American history. So, while the Heller Court rejected
numerous examples of the right to keep and bear arms as a solely
collective right, it did not foreclose some level of collective right in
addition to a personal right.
3. Purpose of the Second Amendment
The nature of the Second Amendment thus appears to be some-
thing more than purely personal, and history, albeit conflicted, sug-
gests the same. Bellotti also demands that we consider the purpose of
the Second Amendment. 324 Its "central component" is self-defense. 325
This central component includes both an individualistic and communi-
tarian aspect. It is individualistic in that the Second Amendment's
purpose is to facilitate individual self-defense in cases of individual
confrontation.326 It is also communitarian in that the "people" have
the right to keep and bear arms as a bulwark against tyrannical gov-
ernment.327 At some point, these justifications can collapse. 328 The
seems limited. See id. at 1216 & nn.296-97 (discussing the effectiveness of regulation for
curbing Pinkerton activity). An interesting breakdown of the respective constitutional
powers of Congress and the states to regulate such private defense organizations is
recorded in one such investigation. See H. REP. No. 2447, at XV-XVI, XXVI-XXIX,
LXVII-111 (1893).
323 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620-21 (2008) (noting that the plaintiff
did not "contend[ ] that States may not ... prohibit[ ]... private paramilitary organiza-
tions"); see also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886) (holding that there is no funda-
mental right to assemble in public as a military force).
324 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (setting forth the Bellotti test).
325 Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036
(2010) (referring to self-defense as the "central component" of the Second Amendment).
326 Heller, 554 U.S. at 592, 595. The Court emphasizes, however, that not all confronta-
tions are the same. Confrontations among school friends or nations are apparently dif-
ferent from anticipated confrontations with robbers. Id. at 595.
327 Id. at 600 (stating that the individual right is necessary to "assure the existence of a
'citizens' militia' as a safeguard against tyranny"). As I have written, however, this is an
inchoate citizens' militia. If mobilized, the members become subject to government over-
sight or the political sympathy of others. See Miller, supra note 72, at 1320.
328 For a discussion of the doctrinal problem posed when these justifications collapse
into a single person, the lawless law enforcement officer, see Miller, supra note 89, at
939-58. For more about these two strains in the context of private policing, see Sklansky,
supra note 309, at 1190-91.
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Court has yet to make any meaningful distinction between a threat
posed by one, ten, or a hundred thousand persons.329 In fact,
McDonald's conclusion that the Framers and Ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment believed the right to bear arms essential for
Freedmen to protect themselves makes this distinction harder to
maintain, as a lone individual would stand little chance resisting a law-
less militia. 330
If the Second Amendment's central purpose is to facilitate a nat-
ural right to self-defense, then some type of collective right to bear
arms for self-defense would also seem to fall within its scope. Associa-
tions magnify the ability of persons to exercise their core right. Just as
individuals can better exercise their First Amendment rights by associ-
ating together, individuals can better exercise their Second
Amendment rights by association. After all, a person shouting from a
soapbox is far less effective at communicating than are ten thousand
persons in a parade. 331 Similarly, a lone gunman is far less able to
defend himself than is an armed gang.332 Just as the right "peaceably
to assemble" is an individual right that is exercised collectively, one
can imagine the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms as
329 Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection, 9
CONST. COMMENT. 87, 93 (1992) ("Whether murder, rape, and theft be committed by gangs
of assassins, tyrannous officials and judges or pillaging soldiery was a mere detail .... The
right to resist and to possess arms therefore remained the same ... "); David B. Kopel,
The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1359, 1454 n.358
("[T]he theme [of the Second Amendment's Framers] was self-defense, and the question of
how many criminals were involved (one, or a standing army) was merely a detail."). But see
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 586 (2008) (stating that there is no Second
Amendment right to "wage war"). Elsewhere I have suggested some doctrinal tools that
can help distinguish between individual self-defense and individual opposition to govern-
ment. See Miller, supra note 72, at 1303-56 (suggesting demarcation at home to preserve
difference); Miller, supra note 89, at 966-67 (suggesting alternative approaches for evalu-
ating the Second Amendment in the context of resisting arrest).
330 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038-42 (suggesting that the purpose of incorporating the
Second Amendment was to allow Freedmen to defend themselves from unreconstructed
state militias).
331 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) ("The
First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely
pamphleteer.").
332 Some have suggested that the Second Amendment might protect associations such as
private gun clubs or private firing ranges. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Constitutional
Limits on Regulating Private Militia Groups, 58 MONT. L. REV. 45, 54 (1997) ("Firing
ranges and gun clubs should receive constitutional protection precisely because they have
standing to assert the Second Amendment rights of their members."). Others have sug-
gested that the right is broad enough to protect private self-defense organizations. See, e.g.,
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of Workers To Assemble and To Bear Arms: Presser v.
Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 943, 949-50 (1999) (discussing the history of a labor organiza-
tion's assembling with arms).
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an individual right that can be exercised collectively, albeit perhaps, in
a more tightly circumscribed manner. 333
Further, the Second Amendment, as interpreted by the Court,
shares certain "positive" and "negative" purposes associated with the
First. As Martin Redish and Howard Wasserman have observed, First
Amendment free speech protection is justified by theories that can be
broadly organized as "positive" and "negative. ' 334 Positive values of
free speech protection focus on speech's ability to further individual
self-realization, personal expression, and autonomy. 335 Negative theo-
ries of free speech focus on the "skeptical, mistrustful strain" of
American politics. 336 These theories view freedom of speech, espe-
cially organized speech, as essential to counter malignant forces such
as totalizing or abusive government.337
The Second Amendment seems to track these positive and nega-
tive purposes of free speech protection. Protection of the right to fire-
arms advances positive values such as individual autonomy because it
empowers persons to defend themselves against private and public
threats. It also advances the negative values, such as checks on gov-
ernment, if one accepts the proposition that the Second Amendment
contains an antityranny principle. 338
The corporate form acts as a force multiplier for the positive and
negative values of these Amendments. Corporations and other
associations promote the positive values of those Amendments
because they form a matrix to nurture an individual's feelings of self-
actualization, self-worth, and self-identification. They also advance the
negative values of the First and Second Amendments because both
group political speech and armed individuals form a buffer between
government and the individual. The question, which I raise in Part IV
333 Cf. David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723,
738-39 (2009) ("Much like federalism and the separation of powers, constitutional features
such as the right to assemble and the right to bear arms were intended both to prevent the
concentration of absolute power and to protect popular sovereignty."). One does not have
to accept as a corollary to the right to assemble with arms, a right to form private armed
patrols of public areas. Such a group right would run counter to one thread of the history
of public arms-bearing. Instead, one may find a constitutionally protected right to form a
gun club on private property, but no constitutional right to form a gun club parade, or to
form a self-defense patrol of the neighborhood streets.
334 Redish & Wasserman, supra note 280, at 243.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 243-44, 260-61; see also Green, supra note 106, at 173 n.136 (discussing the
First Amendment as necessary for democratic protections).
338 Green, supra note 106, at 172-73. Green notes one way to view the right is that,
although it grants each person a right to arms, "the right is collective in the sense that it
exists to protect the majority's power [against tyrannical minorities], rather than protect
the interests that individuals have against the majority." Id.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
GUNS, INC
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
below, is how can society ensure that these rights-bearing private
groups do not themselves become destructive, insular, or despotic, as
they did during Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the Gilded Age, and
as they have in many other nations around the world?
In any event, this analysis casts doubt on the idea that the nature,
history, and purpose of the Second Amendment unquestionably jus-
tify its classification as a purely personal right.
B. Corporate Personhood Theory and Its Effect on Corporate
Second Amendment Rights
Assuming the Second Amendment right is not purely personal,
the second inquiry is whether the corporate form has any bearing on
its scope. 339 In Citizens United, the Court held that the corporate form
had no impact on the scope of political speech. Either the corporation
has rights equivalent to natural persons because it is a real entity, or a
corporation has rights equivalent to natural persons because it is an
aggregation of rights-holders who use corporate law to amplify the
members' political voices. In either case, nothing about the corporate
form warrants any reduction in First Amendment protection.
How the Court approaches corporate Second Amendment rights
will require some conclusion about the corporate form. As noted
above, corporate theory informs the manner in which courts approach
corporate constitutional rights claims at the same time that corporate
theory legitimates those very decisions. Moreover, corporate per-
sonhood theory provides some of the tempering doctrine that the
Court has all but invited lower courts to use in deciding Second
Amendment cases.
Whether the Court views a corporate right to keep and bear arms
through the analytical tools of artificial entity, real entity, or aggregate
entity theory will produce profound and potentially surprising conse-
quences for corporate Second Amendment rights.
1. Artificial Entity Theory and the Second Amendment
The Court could conclude that the right to keep and bear arms is
purely personal and that an artificial entity such as a corporation has
no Second Amendment rights. However, as discussed above, that
result seems unlikely given the text, purpose, and history of the
Second Amendment. Even if it were likely, the Court need not go so
far as to hold that the Second Amendment is purely personal in order
339 See, e.g., United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir.
1979) (noting that Bellotti creates a rebuttable presumption that corporations have consti-
tutional rights).
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for it to confer some lesser degree of Second Amendment protection
on a corporation. As discussed in Part II, the Court relies on the artifi-
ciality of the corporation as a categorical tool to justify corporate reg-
ulation to an extent intolerable if applied to a natural person.
In this scenario, the Court could justify almost any regulation of
corporate Second Amendment rights short of absolute prohibition.
Essentially, the effect would be to resurrect the reasoning of Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce and the dissent in Citizens United,
but as applied to the Second Amendment rather than to the First. An
absolute prohibition on corporate arsenals and employment of private
security would be unconstitutional; but heavy regulation of this right
would be permitted, under the reasoning that the state has an interest
in preventing "Frankenstein"-like private police forces from operating
under the aegis of state incorporation law.
Ideological organizations may, but need not, produce a slightly
different analysis. To the extent they attempt to perform their associa-
tive functions with the help of the corporate form, such organizations
would be subject to the restrictions imposed on corporations. If they
attempt to perform their associative activities outside the corporate
form, they could potentially do so without additional restrictions;
alternatively, they could be protected by some higher level of scrutiny
or subject to some narrow exception, in a similar manner to how ideo-
logical or political associations are treated in the First Amendment
context.
Perhaps counterintuitively, the artificial entity approach to corpo-
rate Second Amendment rights strengthens the constitutional basis of
guns-to-work laws. Just as the artificiality of the corporation justifies
protecting minority shareholders and other stakeholders in a corpora-
tion, the artificiality of the corporation would justify regulation of its
right to keep and bear arms. If the state believes that the optimal way
to protect gun-bearing minorities in the corporation is to allow them
to carry their firearms onto the employer's property, then such regula-
tion would be constitutional.
Corporations involved in the firearm trade could also be subject
to fairly regular and heavy regulation, but again, they could not be
eliminated. Following Biswell,340 the government would be able to
demonstrate a compelling interest in ensuring firearms were properly
manufactured and did not end up in the wrong hands. Nevertheless, a
corporation could still raise a Second Amendment defense if the regu-
lation eliminated it from the marketplace, broadly defined.
340 See supra text accompanying notes 205-10 (discussing Biswell).
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Artificial entity theory in these cases would give the Court room
to fashion tests that it has otherwise forbidden in Second Amendment
cases.341 Corporations, like felons, children, or the mentally ill, would
then become another category of persons for whom a different level
of protection would apply. Such an approach would fit Second
Amendment corporate jurisprudence with Fourth Amendment corpo-
rate jurisprudence, and would rationalize the Court's dicta regarding
firearm regulation. However, it would also place corporations in a cat-
egory for purposes of the Second Amendment that the Citizens United
Court rejected for purposes of the First.
2. Real Entity Theory and the Second Amendment
Alternatively, the Court could conclude that the corporation has
Second Amendment rights equal to those of a natural person, which
are also independent of the Second Amendment rights of either its
principals or its agents. Neither the internal dynamics of corporate
governance nor its status as for-profit or nonprofit would have any
consequence.
A corporation's right to employ, equip, and train its own security
guards would then be subject only to the same regulations that are
placed upon natural persons. Additional hurdles for private security,
such as requiring background checks, drug screening, or special
licensing, would be economically prudent (it is unlikely that insurers
would allow a large corporation to operate a security detail without
such supplementary measures). But these requirements-over and
above those placed on a natural person-could not be imposed by
government regulation. Restrictions such as state constitutional
prohibitions on a corporation's ability to "organize, maintain, or
employ an armed body of men" likely would be facially unconstitu-
tional,342 irrespective of the organization's for-profit or nonprofit
status. If the core purpose of the right to keep and bear arms is for
self-defense, the commercial status of the entity exercising the right
would not matter. Neither incorporated for-profit, nor nonprofit, nor
vigilance organizations could be prevented from amassing or training
with arms on their own property any more than could a natural
person.
By contrast, corporations viewed as a real entity would have
strong constitutional grounds to challenge government imposition of
guns-to-work laws. Suits against guns-to-work laws have thus far
341 See supra text accompanying notes 8080-87 (discussing the Court's refusal to apply
balancing tests to Second Amendment restrictions).
342 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 26; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
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involved challenges on the basis of regulatory taking under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, federal workplace safety preemp-
tion,343 or First Amendment free exercise claims (in the case of
churches). 344 These suits have had mixed success.345 However, a cor-
poration with self-defense rights equal to those of a natural person
would have a much stronger position. The right to self-defense
includes a right to disarm another.346 And there may even be a right
not to keep and bear arms.347 Few would think, for example, that a
state could pass a law requiring you to accept an armed visitor into
your backyard. A corporation could claim that it is a comparable
infringement of the corporation's Second Amendment rights to force
it to suffer the threat of armed employees, contractors, and customers
in areas subject to its control.
Firearms manufacturers and dealers could also argue that any
restrictions on their businesses could not be any more stringent than
those imposed on an individual gunsmith or someone holding a yard
sale. If those individuals were required to be licensed and subject to
inspection, then so would a corporation in the firearms trade. How-
ever, if no such licensing were required for natural persons, neither
could it be imposed on corporations.
Finally, one must consider the consequences of the Court's
attempt to dodge corporate personhood, by focusing, Citizens
United-style, on the scope of the right, rather than on the party
asserting it. As discussed above, attempting to sidestep the corporate
form by focusing on the right simply assumes the equivalence of the
corporate person and the natural person. Therefore, any restriction on
the right for natural persons has to be identical to those of corpora-
tions. If the Court fashions a doctrine based on the "scope" of the
343 See, e.g., Fla. Retail Fed'n, Inc. v. Att'y Gen., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284, 1288-89,
1297-99 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (discussing these challenges brought by a consortium of
retailers).
344 See Edina Cmty. Lutheran Church v. State, 745 N.W.2d 194, 198, 210 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008) (discussing a challenge based on various grounds, including First Amendment
free exercise).
345 Compare Ramsey Winch, Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1211 (10th Cir. 2009)
(upholding a guns-to-work law on rational basis grounds), with Edina Cmty. Lutheran
Church v. State, 2006 WL 6111893, at *5, *16-19 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2006). The Minnesota
Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's striking down of portions of the guns-to-
work law, but did so on alternate state constitution grounds, not ruling on the lower court's
free exercise holding. See Edina Cmty., 745 N.W.2d at 210.
346 See, e.g., State v. Smith, 150 S.E.2d 194, 198 (N.C. 1966) (holding that taking
another's firearm in self-defense is not larceny); see also Green, supra note 106, at 157-58
(stating that under a Lockean analysis, a party does not need to wait to be attacked to
disarm another, but also arguing that mere possession does not justify disarming another).
347 See generally Joseph Blocher, The Right Not To Keep and Bear Arms, forthcoming
STAN. L. REV. (on file with author).
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Second Amendment by reference to the "scope" of the right for cor-
porations, it is simply employing a type of artificial entity determina-
tion in disguise.
3. Aggregate Entity Theory and the Second Amendment
A court could conclude that the corporation has Second
Amendment rights that are not independent of the corporation's prin-
cipals and agents, but that must be respected because the corporation
is simply an association of persons using the corporate form to best
protect their individual constitutional rights. In this model, the gov-
ernment could neither condition its sanction of the corporation on the
surrender of those rights, nor meddle with the individual utility
calculus of a shareholder, director, or agent who has entered into this
nexus of contract.
In most respects, the Court's use of aggregate theory would lead
to Second Amendment protections indistinguishable from the corpo-
ration as a real entity. The focus here is not that the corporation has a
right to keep and bear arms as much as that the right to keep and bear
arms is a default position around which the various parties-such as
management, shareholders, and employees-may contract. Therefore,
as a default, private security guards and vigilance organizations are
placed roughly in the same position as they are with the real entity
theory. However, with aggregation theory, the regulatory function of
the government seems to be on surer footing when the corporate
structure attempts to externalize costs onto noncontracting parties,
such as the public.348
The difference between corporate rights under the real entity
theory, and those under the aggregate entity theory, is that of ratio-
nale versus outcome. In the real entity theory, the minority viewpoint
is invisible. In the aggregate theory, the law assumes the normative
proposition that the market best mediates these competing intra-
organizational values. Those individuals who do not want to be pro-
tected by the corporation in the fashion the corporation provides will
sell their shares or find another job.
Guns-to-work laws present a more difficult point. On one level,
the normative backdrop of the nexus of contract theory resists regula-
tions on contractual relationships with and among the corporation and
348 See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 253, 260 (2009) ("Nexus of contract theorists ... prescribe[s] collateral regulatory
regimes to contain the .. corporation's tendency to externalize its costs to the general
public with whom it has no contractual relationship at all .... "); see also Sklansky, supra
note 309, at 1192-93 (discussing the economic aspects of private policing, including exter-
nalization of costs).
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others. The conclusion is that workers, shareholders, and directors will
best decide for themselves whether guns should be allowed onto com-
pany property. Those who want to work or own shares in such a com-
pany will do so, and those who don't won't. Everyone will be satisfied
based on his or her own utility calculus. 349 On a different level, a regu-
lation requiring a company to accept firearms into its parking lot
could be viewed as a measure that forces the company to internalize
the costs of crime control. These are costs that the corporation might
otherwise spread out amongst the police and taxpayers because it
would be their duty to ensure that the corporate agents and the corpo-
ration are safe.
Aggregate theories of the corporation could also provide stronger
protection for firearm industry participants than the Court's previous
comments on the subject allow. Manufacturers of firearms have a
good argument based on Citizens United that they should enjoy spe-
cial protection under the Second Amendment. One of the Court's pri-
mary concerns with BCRA was the statute's effect on media
companies, which are not specifically identified in the Constitution
but have rights akin to the press. Under this aggregate theory, fire-
arms manufacturers may enjoy special protections under the Second
Amendment that are not given to other types of manufacturers. This
is because in the First Amendment context, the normative assumption
is that a corporation is an aggregate of persons with a right to political
speech. No one is forced to contract with such an aggregate and thus
the ability to withdraw voluntarily is sufficient to protect the interests
of dissenters. As for externalities, the First Amendment assumes that
there is no such thing as an externality, at least with regard to core
political speech. There is bad speech, but the First Amendment com-
mits the republic to the proposition that more speech is always better,
and the way to avoid externalities is by curing bad speech with
good.350 Speech providers-especially those who do so in the aggre-
gate-must be protected so that they can contribute to this
marketplace.
If the Court were to adopt an aggregation approach to corporate
Second Amendment rights, it would require tacit agreement with the
aforementioned economic assumptions. Like speech, the aggregate
theory of corporate Second Amendment rights assumes that markets
take care of objectors. Like speech, the aggregate theory assumes that
the answer to whether more guns in the marketplace is a good or bad
349 See supra Part II.B.3.a.
350 See Hasen, supra note 22, at 607 (discussing bad speech in the context of foreign
versus domestic money in elections); see also supra note 289 (citing the "good speech
curing the bad" proposition in the contexts of Citizens United and Whitney v. California).
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idea is not a disputed empirical proposition351 but a constitutional
imperative.352 In this scenario, the Second Amendment answer to the
bad use of guns is more guns.
IV
THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Corporate Second Amendment rights will test the limits of the
Court's ability to integrate the corporation into our constitutional
structure. The potential for corporations to concentrate some level of
military power, along with political and economic power, will form a
crucible. In that crucible, both the Court's implicit trust in corpora-
tions as healthy mediating institutions in our republic and its trust in
text-based originalism as a methodology for determining how corpo-
rations are to be treated will be put to the fire.
Corporate Second Amendment rights will test the Court's trust in
corporations as intermediaries. In Bellotti, the Court laid down a
rebuttable presumption that business corporations possess all the con-
stitutional rights of human beings. 353 This is a remarkable baseline
from which to begin. It is a powerful vote of confidence that business
corporations are salutary participants in our republic. And it places a
heavy thumb on the scale of pluralist and libertarian notions of demo-
cratic governance, rather than on more republican notions.354 How far
will the Court affirm the presumption that private corporations serve
351 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3125-29 (2010) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that a firearms policy requires difficult empirical judgments that courts
are ill-equipped to make). Compare JOHN R. LoT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:
UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL LAWS 19-20 (2d ed. 2000) (arguing that
more guns in private hands has the effect of reducing incidence of crime), with Ian Ayres &
John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, 1197-1202 (2003) (disputing Lott's empirical results, noting that once dif-
ferent regression models are used, "the core finding of more guns, less crime is reversed,"
and that while Lott's study indicates that concealed-carry gun laws "can lower rates of
murder and rape, better models undermine this conclusion"), and Ian Ayres & John J.
Donohue III, The Latest Misfires in Support of the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothesis,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1372-74 (2003) (dispensing with criticism of prior article, con-
cluding that they "have not been moved to change any of the opinions we previously
advanced"). For the record, I remain utterly agnostic about the hypothesis. See Miller,
supra note 72, at 1278 n.*.
352 See Green, supra note 106, at 146 (observing that one theory of the Second
Amendment right is that it "constitutionalizes the empirical judgment that private arms
possession promotes public safety").
353 See supra text accompanying notes 179-180.
354 Cass Sunstein has identified four "liberal republican[ ]" principles: political delibera-
tion, equality of political actors, belief in the common good, and citizenship, as the method
to inculcate political virtue. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539, 1541-42 (1988). This is contrasted with pluralism, which sees "politics . . . [as] a
struggle among interest groups for scarce social resources," in which "[f]aws are a kind of
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a vital and beneficial intermediary role in our republic? Will corporate
Second Amendment rights simply be a bridge too far, the point at
which the corporation turns from a valuable check on government
overreach to an intolerable threat to democratic governance?
Corporate Second Amendment rights also will test the Court's
resolve to decide Second Amendment cases with originalist method-
ology. How far will the Court depart from its stated textual and
originalist commitments when confronted by powerful and potentially
threatening mediating institutions that do not fall neatly within consti-
tutional text or history? Will the Court's fidelity to historically defined
categories and its repudiation of interest-balancing lead it to conclude
that the Constitution requires such powerful intermediaries to possess
weapons on the same level as natural persons no matter the cost?
Part IV.A discusses the ambivalent role intermediary organiza-
tions, including corporations, play in our democracy. Part IV.B
explains how existing categories in constitutional law do not ade-
quately consider the reality of especially large, powerful
intermediaries like corporations. Part IV.C briefly outlines some basic
principles that the Court can use in judging whether an intermediary
organization, including a corporation, may claim a constitutional lib-
erty. Above all, it urges the Court to be more circumspect about aban-
doning the existing constitutional structures that implicate mediating
institutions.
A. The Corporation as Intermediary Organization
The modern business corporation forms an important interme-
diary organization in our society. Intermediary organizations are col-
lectives of people interposed between the individual and the state and
that mediate the individual's relationship both with the state and with
other individuals. 355 Political parties, Girl Scout troops, parent-teacher
associations, athletic leagues, and business corporations are just some
of the legion of intermediary organizations that exist within a polity.
The role of these intermediary organizations, to borrow Adam
Winkler's terminology, can be both "salutary" and "perilous. '356
commodity, subject to the forces of supply and demand" and in which "[v]arious groups...
compete for loyalty and support from citizens." Id. at 1542.
355 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectives: Toward a Jurisprudence of
Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1213, 1213-14 (1994) (identifying intermediary institutions as
possessing a positional and functional relationship with individuals and the state).
356 See Winkler, supra note 138, at 1244, 1260-72.
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Intermediary organizations, including corporations, are a salutary
part of a functional and healthy republic. 357 De Tocqueville celebrated
them as among the best aspects of the American experiment. 358 Their
role is two-fold. First, intermediary organizations form a matrix for
personal autonomy and fulfillment.35 9 As Amy Gutmann has written,
"[b]y associating with one another, we engage in camaraderie, cooper-
ation, dialogue, deliberation, negotiation, competition, creativity, and
the kinds of self-expression and self-sacrifice that are possible only in
association with others. '' 360 Second, they form an important buffer
between the state and the individual.361 Without this "stratum of inter-
mediate associations," the citizen is left standing "naked before the
state, unable to protect [himself] against its tendency to rule. '362 As
discussed previously, these roles of intermediary organizations are
mirrored in the justification for constitutional protection of both
speech and the right to keep and bear arms. These liberties advance
personal autonomy and fulfillment and act as a barrier to totalizing
government.
But intermediary organizations can also be perilous. They can be
oppressive to their own members, abusive to outsiders, and a menace
357 See Sunstein, supra note 354 at 1573 (noting the benefits that intermediary institu-
tions provide as part of a thriving republic, including community and the opportunity for
deliberation).
358 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 115-200 (Henry Reeve
trans., Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1945) (1840).
359 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1573, 1575; Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad,
and the Ugly: Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949, 967
(2004); see also Redish & Wasserman, supra note 280, at 237, 260-64 (making this point in
light of First Amendment corporate speech).
360 David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of
Association, 1999 Sup. CT. REV. 203, 231 (quoting Amy Gutmann, Freedom of Association:
An Introductory Essay, in FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 3, 3-4 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998)).
361 See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984) (describing these relation-
ships as "buffers"); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
856, 897 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995)) ("[I]t is perfectly plausible to think of the corporation as an intermediary institution
standing between the individual and Leviathan."); Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1573
(noting that private organizations "serve both as checks on government and as arenas for
the cultivation and expression of republican virtues"); see also Vischer, supia note 359, at
967 (identifying one value of intermediary organizations as resisting any "hegemonizing
ambitions" of government (quoting Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's
Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841, 1853 (2001))).
362 See Ernest A. Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
874, 885 (2006) (quoting Alan Wolfe, Democracy, Social Science, and Rationality:
Reflections on Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, in EDMUND BURKE,
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 268, 274 (Frank M. Turner ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1790)).
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to civic virtues. 363 Intermediary organizations, no matter how initially
democratic and egalitarian, tend to become bureaucratic and repres-
sive. This is the famous "iron law of oligarchy. ''364 An elite class in
almost any organization eventually comes to dominate it. The oppres-
sion is not just internally directed; intermediary organizations can
abuse non-members by becoming exclusive, reclusive, and monopo-
listic. 365 Prior to the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, for example,
corporations and other associations freely discriminated against
women, as well as racial, religious, and ethnic minorities. Simultane-
ously, they concentrated political, economic, and social power into the
hands of predominately white males. Intermediary organizations also
have the potential to siphon away commitments to the social contract
and public good and to channel them to more narrow forms of paro-
chialism and tribalism. 366
Business corporations magnify some of these problems of oli-
garchy and oppression because of their size, power, ubiquity, and
amorality. The modern business corporation is an intermediary organ-
ization so different in magnitude as to be different in kind. Large cor-
porations possess powers that, taken together, can functionally
replicate sovereignty. 367 They concentrate economic resources that
rival some nation-states. 368 They have foreign alliances and foreign
policy. 369 Sometimes they exercise security functions, especially in
363 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1574 ("A system that allowed intermediate organiza-
tions to proceed without regulation would lead to intolerable results."); Winkler, supra
note 138, at 1260-66 (explaining the "perilous association view" of corporations).
364 Don Herzog, Dragonslaying, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 763 (2005) (reviewing GERRY
MACKIE, DEMOCRACY DEFENDED (2005)) (making similar points in discussing the iron law
of oligarchy).
365 As one court said, "without supervision ... or if permitted unrestrainedly to control
and monopolize .. . [corporations] become a public menace, against which public policy
and statutes design protection." Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365-66 (N.Y. 1888).
366 See Vischer, supra note 359, at 963 (noting that exceedingly "thick" associations tend
to become distrustful and insular).
367 See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal
Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173, 174 (1979) (observing that the corporation "has
become a basic social institution and a center of power resembling governmental struc-
tures" (quoting PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MEGACORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY:
THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER 1 (1975))); Garrett, supra note 17, at 130-32 (dis-
cussing how corporations have aspects of sovereigns); O'Melinn, supra note 190, at 206
("The corporation has not only acquired a power of sovereignty over its membership
through a steady delegation of sovereign power from the state, it has also managed to
attain real powers of government over the broader public.").
368 See Garrett, supra note 17, at 146-48 (noting that the "largest corporations" have
revenues several times greater than the gross domestic product of some developing
countries).
369 See id. at 148-51 ("[C]orporations engage in diplomacy, establish outposts in other
nations, engage in trade negotiations, and often serve as proxies for their home country's
government.").
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those societies where the professional police and military are corrupt
or unreliable. 370 Thomas Hobbes listed corporations as among
those things that "[w]eaken, or tend to the Dissolution of a
Common-Wealth. '371 As he graphically put it, corporations are like
worms within the body politic, for "the great number of
Corporations" act as "many lesser Common-wealths in the bowels of
a greater. ' 372 Many leaders-including Jefferson, Lincoln, and
Theodore Roosevelt-viewed corporations as potentially grave
threats to the survival of the American republic.373
At the same time, large corporations are not constrained by
duties of national allegiance or constitutional limitations that control
other types of institutions.374 They may be owned in part or in whole
by citizens of other nations. 375 They are not especially democratic in
their operation. 376 As Christopher Tiedeman warned over a century
ago, private corporations can become "a menace to the liberty of the
individual, and to the stability of the American States as popular gov-
ernments. ' 377 The possibility of armed corporations places Bellotti's
default presumptions about the salutary nature of these organizations
to the test.
370 See id. at 152-53 (noting that corporations may undertake police functions, such as
"guarding corporate facilities, investigating crimes, or protecting employees," particularly
where the state fails to provide such services); see also Andr6 M. Pefialver, Note,
Corporate Disconnect: The Blackwater Problem and the FCPA Solution, 19 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 459, 485 (2010) (noting that the British South Africa Company created a
police force, "which was, in actuality, the company's standing army").
371 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 232 (A.R. Walker ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1904) (1651).
372 Id. at 241. In fact, Hobbes conceived of the sovereign itself as an "artificial person."
See Alice Ristroph, Covenants for the Sword 8 & n.11 (Sept. 13, 2009) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
373 See Timothy K. Kuhner, The Separation of Business and State, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
2353, 2366-67 (2007) (quoting these presidents as associating powerful corporations with
corruption).
374 Millon, Ambiguous Significance, supra note 179, at 40 ("[C]orporate status has long
implied economic and political power without accountability."); Sklansky, supra note 309,
at 1183 ("[Tjhe vast set of interrelated Constitutional doctrines that regulate the day-to-
day operations of police officers.., has almost nothing to say about the activities of private
security guards.").
375 See Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (holding that
property rights of a corporation duly organized under the laws of Russia were entitled to
constitutional protection under the Fifth Amendment); see also Sklansky, supra note 309 at
1182 (commenting on multinational ownership and control of private security).
376 See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Markets and Democracy: The Illegitimacy of Corporate
Law, 74 UMKC L. REV. 41, 41-60 (2005) (arguing that corporate law is not democratic
because it is removed from political processes and is largely a product of markets).
377 Horwitz, supra note 177, at 206 (quoting CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE
ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
383 (1900)).
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B. The Limited Vocabulary for Corporate Constitutional Rights
A related problem is the paucity of our constitutional vocabulary
to address these intermediary organizations. As important as the
modem business corporation is as a mediating institution, it is almost
completely absent from the text or the history of our written constitu-
tion. The Constitution's drafting history indicates that the business
corporation as it exists today was not within the imagination of the
Framers. Corporate Second Amendment rights therefore challenge
the Court's current preference for originalist methodologies.
The Bill of Rights is commonly understood as a document domi-
nated by classical liberal philosophy. 378 In this world-view there are
two antagonistic forces: the individual and the state. 379 Initially, the
Constitution largely confined this antagonism to the struggle between
individuals and the federal government. 380 But Reconstruction, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the process of selective incorporation of
the Bill of Rights including, now, the right to keep and bear arms,
broadened and deepened this individualism. 381 Today, this individual
rights structure operates not only against the federal government, but
against all levels of government and against most agents of
government.
The problem of corporations as intermediary organizations is
really a problem of calibration. 382 What is the appropriate level of
protection for intermediary organizational power? At what point does
378 See A.E. Dick Howard, A Traveler from an Antique Land: The Modern Renaissance
of Comparative Constitutionalism, 50 VA. J. INT'L L. 3, 20 (2009) (labeling U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights as examples of classical liberal constitutions). But see
Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1566-67 (arguing that the Constitution contains elements of
both liberalism and republicanism).
379 See Miller, supra note 17, at 193 ("When the fundamental law was written in 1787
the Framers of the Constitution envisaged but two legal entities: the individual person and
the government. Nothing intermediate was contemplated."); see also Vischer, supra note
359, at 950 ("We tend to formulate legal interests, rights, and obligations in terms that are
easily classified between the individual on one side and the state on the other.").
380 See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the
Bill of Rights restricts only the federal, not state, government). An exception would be the
prohibition on bills of attainder, which the Constitution forbids to both states and the fed-
eral government. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9 (prohibiting congressional bills of attainder);
id. Art. I, § 10 (prohibiting state bills of attainder).
381 See Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 145, 178 (2008) (noting how incorporation made the Constitution more individual-
istic); cf Miller, supra note 89, at 968-74 (2011) (discussing the effect of Second
Amendment antityranny rationales as applied against individual police officers).
382 See Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties,
Associational Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 295 (2001)
(noting that the object of intermediary organizations is to "'counterbalance the state ...
while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace."' (quoting
ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY 5 (1994))); see also Kuhner, supra note 373, at
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the salutary intermediary organization become a perilous one? And
what forces are best able to gauge and supply the calibration?
One perspective is to protect the corporation through constitu-
tional law, and then allow the market to do the adjustment. But mar-
kets fail, and sometimes fail spectacularly. 38 3 For example, when
individuals formed private self-defense leagues during
Reconstruction, the Klan developed. 38 4 State regulatory intervention
could therefore be another source of calibration.385 This has been the
primary justification for campaign finance restrictions on corpora-
tions. But such regulation creates its own problems: Once you
summon Leviathan to pacify Behemoth, whom do you summon to
pacify Leviathan? 38 6
The Court has only a limited vocabulary to deal with large and
influential intermediary organizations. 387 Instead, the history of public
law is one of desperate attempts to shoehorn the business corporation
into an older set of legal models, often with incongruous results.388 As
detailed in Part II, the Court uses clumsy historical tools like the artifi-
23, 54-55 (claiming that the question of interaction of market and democracy "boils down
to one of degree").
383 Witness the 2008 recession, which was precipitated by a housing and credit crisis that
many economists ascribe to a catastrophic failure of the self-regulating power of the
market. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE
SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
384 See Miller, supra note 72, at 1329-36, 1347-50 (discussing the self-defense claims of
the Klan); Miller, supra note 89, at 968-70 (discussing the predatory actions of self-
described self-defense organizations in the Reconstruction South). Cf Green, supra note
106, at 178 ("[A]rming the population [can] create a new oppressor-an armed majority of
private citizens.").
385 Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 355, at 1214 (discussing the need for the state to protect
persons from intermediary organizations if intermediaries develop oppressive tendencies).
386 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1574 ("Government must ... play a role in limiting
the powers of [intermediary] organizations without denying the importance of [those orga-
nizations'] continued existence."). Professor Dan-Cohen uses another metaphor from the
ancients: "Don't the individuals who call upon the state's assistance knowingly bring in a
Trojan Horse of gigantic proportions?" Dan-Cohen, supra note 355, at 1214.
387 Issacharoff, supra note 382, at 293-94 (discussing the problem of categorizing inter-
mediary institutions as either entities that enjoy autonomy or entities that can be subject to
state regulation); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1870 (2003) ("Corporations have historically
represented an anomaly to liberal legal thinkers who envisioned the world as sharply
divided between state power and individual right holders .... A corporation was both-an
association of individual right holders, on the one hand, but an entity with state-like
powers, on the other.").
388 See Tsuk, supra note 387, at 1870 (describing one strategy: "[D]ivid[e] corporations
into two different entities-public corporations that assimilate[ ] the role of the state, such
as municipal associations, and private corporations that assimilate[] the role of the indi-
vidual in society, such as business organizations."); Vischer, supra note 359, at 950
(observing that the law tries "to force disputes involving associations into a close approxi-
mation of this bipolar framework [between the state and the individual]").
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cial person to try to calibrate the correct level of protection versus
regulation of large intermediary organizations.
Alternatively, the Court uses the private/public distinction to the
same effect. The case of Marsh v. Alabama389 is a perfect example of
this. In Marsh, a woman was arrested by the state for proselytizing on
the property of a private company that operated and controlled an
entire town. The Court held that a private corporation that had essen-
tially taken over the operation of a municipality could not rely on its
private character to defend itself against the First Amendment rights
of an individual.390
Large intermediary organizations like corporations seem to
bewilder constitutional methodologies that demand slavish devotion
to historically-defined categories that predate the rise of the modern
corporation, or that depend upon appeals to pre-political natural
rights, or that do both-as was the case with the Court's Second
Amendment analyses in Heller and McDonald.391 These deeply
rooted constitutional categories, at least as the current Court con-
ceives of them, seem inadequate to deal with the phenomenon of the
large multinational organization.392 The potential of corporate Second
Amendment rights may well force the Court to craft a more flexible
approach to constitutional adjudication than its recent pronounce-
ments on the First and Second Amendments would countenance.
389 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (holding that "[w]hether a corporation or a municipality
owns or possesses the town[,] the public in either case" has a protected First Amendment
interest). Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) ("[Wlhen private individuals or
groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature they
become ... subject to ... constitutional limitations."); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 463,
468-70 (1953) (holding that party elections held under the banner of a "self-governing
voluntary club" can still violate the Fifteenth Amendment). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (noting that company property does not lose its private character
when the company takes on something less than "all of the attributes of a state-created
municipality").
390 See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 505-06.
391 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1580 (noting the republican skepticism of the theo-
ries of government that rely on rights discourse that "antedate[s] political deliberation").
392 See id. at 1539. Sunstein writes:
History does not supply conceptions of political life that can be applied
mechanically to current problems. Circumstances change; theoretical commit-
ments cannot be wrenched out of context without great risk of distortion; con-
temporary social and legal issues can never be resolved merely through
recovery of features, however important and attractive, of the distant past.
Id.; see also Greenwood, supra note 16, at 1007 (noting this problem).
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
GUNS, INC
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
C. Reframing Corporate Constitutional Rights:
A Preliminary Assessment
It is clear that we need a new framework for corporate constitu-
tional rights. We must also recognize the obvious: Not all constitution-
ally protected behavior works the same in the aggregate as it does
individually.393 An individual riding armed to defend himself or others
is a cautious traveler; a hundred persons riding armed for the defense
of themselves or others is a militia, or a mob.394 A home buyer who
covenants not to possess firearms is a respectful neighbor; a village of
private covenants not to possess firearms is a zoning regulation. 395 The
potential for collectives to concentrate the core function of the social
compact-the monopoly on legitimate violence-into private hands
provides an opportunity to re-examine the entire analytical structure
of corporate constitutional rights.
If, indeed, arguments about corporate constitutional rights are
"really normative arguments masquerading as positive assertions," 396
then the problem with constitutional rights and corporations is not a
problem of corporate personhood per se. It may not even be a
problem of the public/private distinction. Instead, the problem is with
the "scalability" of a constitutional rights structure that has typically
focused on the individual in a nation where people often behave in
groups.397 What the doctrine needs is a methodology to resolve these
four questions: (1) What constitutionally protected individual
behavior is protected to the same degree in the aggregate as it is indi-
vidually?; (2) What constitutionally protected individual behavior is
393 As one court, dealing with the fallout of an "open carry" rally at a local restaurant
observed, "There are any number of activities, legal in themselves, but taken collectively
may pose risks and dangers (to the public and to officers on the scene) and, thereby gen-
erate a reasonable suspicion to justify what would otherwise be a Fourth Amendment inva-
sion." Banks v. Gallagher, 686 F. Supp. 2d 499, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
394 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 72, at 1347-48 (discussing how the Klan used self-defense
to justify terror of Freedmen).
395 For a discussion of restrictive covenants concerning guns, see John-Patrick Fritz,
Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the Door: Questioning the Validity of
Restrictive Covenants Against the Right To Bear Arms, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 551 (2007). For
more of this issue in the context of racially restrictive covenants, see Darrell A.H. Miller,
White Cartels, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 999, 1007 (2008) and Darrell A.H. Miller, State DOMAs, Neutral
Principles, and the MObius of State Action, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. 967, 972 (2008).
396 Millon, Ambiguous Significance, supra note 179, at 25.
397 Cf Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 293 (2010) (remarking in the context of executive power that "the
Constitution does not create a set of institutional arrangements ... that are easily scal-
able"). Professor Epstein goes on to observe that "an efficient distribution of power for a
small government turns out to be an overrigid distribution of power for an expanded
state," an observation that can be expanded to constitutional liberties themselves. Id.
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not protected when exercised in the aggregate?; (3) What constitu-
tionally protected individual behavior is protected in the aggregate,
but to a different degree than individual behavior?; and (4) What is
the theoretical basis for distinguishing between these options?398
A full exploration of this framing device is the work of future
scholarship. However, some initial principles are apparent. First, some
constitutional rights have no sensible application to intermediary
organizations at all. The right to habeas corpus, for example, is non-
sensical if applied to corporations or associations. They have no body
to be shown, and to extend the metaphor to a corporation would shift
constitutional reasoning from the analogical to the chimerical. Second,
not all intermediary organizations in our constitutional structure are
completely undetermined. Despite the Constitution's silence on most
intermediary institutions, the Constitution does contemplate some
collective behavior. The First Amendment Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses, for example, contemplate the existence of, and
perhaps a role for, churches or organized religious worship.399 So do
the militia clauses. Despite their de-institutionalization in Heller and
McDonald, the militia clauses have not been swept completely out of
the Constitution.400 In a similar way, the text of the Constitution ele-
vates the institution of the press over other speakers. 401 Frederick
Schauer has proposed that the First Amendment be understood
within an institutional framework, contextualized by the institutions in
which speech operates-an Institutional First Amendment.40 2 Perhaps
a similar model should be considered for the Second.40 3
398 Cf Henning, supra note 163, at 798 n.19 (discussing the need for distinguishing
between personal and "somewhat personal" constitutional rights).
399 See Sunstein, supra note 354, at 1573 (noting that religious intermediary organiza-
tions can help promote civic republicanism). For more on the constitutional meaning of
associations, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978 (2011).
400 See Miller, supra note 72, at 1319-20 (arguing that the "people's militia," when
mobilized, becomes an institution that is subject to state control).
401 See Blocher, supra note 93, at 850 (observing the Institutional First Amendment
theory that the state should express solicitude for reporters as opposed to other types of
speakers, due to the institutional value of the press).
402 Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 84, 84-86 (1998) [hereinafter Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment] (suggesting that the expansion of free speech rights claims, especially in the
context of government land, funds, or agents, demands an attention to institutional settings
of speech); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 1256 (2005); see also Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57
DUKE L.J. 821, 847-52 (2008) (explaining Professor Schauer's approach).
403 1 have suggested in other places at least one manner in which this institutional
Second Amendment approach could work. Public display of weapons places bearers of
those weapons in the category of militia members, whose rights are constrained by the
plenary authority of the state or federal government to regulate; private weapons represent
an inchoate or quiescent militia, which represents the private Second Amendment right at
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At the very least, this model suggests that courts should be wary
of dispensing too readily with those collective institutions that the
Constitution does contemplate, such as the organized militia, the
press, organized religion, or the states.40 4 The important point for
future constitutional adjudication is to recognize that some kinds of
collectives and some kinds of intermediary institutions are textually
and historically indicated, but that the process of fitting them within
our constitutional structure requires a form of legal reasoning that
cannot be over-rigid, one-sided, or value-free.
CONCLUSION
The future of corporate constitutional rights is opaque and full of
risk. After Citizens United, courts are already struggling to make dis-
tinctions between corporations and natural persons in other First
Amendment areas;40 5 other constitutional provisions cannot be far
behind. As one judge put it, corporate constitutional rights is "an idea
that continues to evolve in complex and unexpected ways. ' 40 6 This
Article has attempted to explore the ways in which the Court may
approach the issue of corporate Second Amendment rights, whenever
that day comes. This Article has also attempted to offer some
resources to jurists and scholars who want to develop an alternative
way of conceiving of the problem of corporate constitutional rights in
general, one that is respectful of institutional history but also of insti-
tutional competence. As corporations and other intermediary organi-
zations come to have greater influence over our lives, it will ultimately
be up to the Court to decide how they best fit within our constitu-
tional republic and who is best positioned to do the tailoring.
Professor Bainbridge has sagely observed that "[e]ffective legal
rules and reliable predictions about human behavior must be based
upon the fallen state of human beings. ' 40 7 In different ways, Citizens
United and McDonald augur a resurrection of laissez-faire constitu-
its apogee. See Miller, supra note 72, at 1308, 1320. Professor Volokh has also considered
institutional settings for firearms and self-defense, albeit with far more categorical flexi-
bility than the Court has countenanced. See generally Volokh, supra note 93, at 1516-28.
404 See, e.g., Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, supra note 402,
at 84 (noting the Court's refusal to accord the press special institutional treatment
"[diespite the textual mandate of the Press Clause").
405 See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 741 F. Supp. 2d 1115,
1126-28, 1132-34 (D. Minn. 2010) (challenging state regulations mandating disclosure and
prohibiting corporate contributions to candidates); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 706 F.
Supp. 2d 1065, 1083-85 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (challenging corporate contribution restrictions).
406 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 118 n.ll (2d Cir. 2010) (citing
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)).
407 Bainbridge, supra note 361, at 886.
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tionalism. They both appear to operate on a faith that individuals,
acting collectively and in their own interest, will make everyone better
off in the long run. Moreover, they both suggest that certain portions
of the Constitution require this faith. Perhaps they are right.
But the history of private collectives empowered by notions of
inalienable rights has sometimes been as ugly as the history of public
collectives who deny those same rights. The depravity of private and
public collectives during Reconstruction and Jim Crow is a prime
example.
The decision where to place one's trust in fallen man-in his
public institutions or in his private ones-is fraught with danger. We
can only hope that when a corporate Second Amendment case comes
before the Court, the Court's trust will not be misplaced.
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